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Tropical cyclones are one of the most destructive and costly natural hazards in the 
United States. Boat owners and marinas are uniquely impacted by these devastating 
events. Boats pose a substantial monetary loss to owners unable to evacuate or mitigate 
damage prior to hurricane landfall, and the time it takes to secure them may impact a 
household’s ability to evacuate in a timely manner. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the physical and social variables that influence an owner’s decision, as well as 
how this decision affects the household’s ability to evacuate and the timing of that 
evacuation. This was done through quantitative and qualitative methods – specifically, 
surveying boat owners at a marina in Charleston and Georgetown and semi-structured 
interviews with Charleston marina and boatyard managers. The survey was a self-
administered questionnaire designed by the researcher, and the interviews were based on 
questions derived from NOAA’s manual, “Hurricane Preparedness: Guidelines for 
Marinas” (2002). Findings indicate that storm magnitude and landfall location 
significantly influence boat mitigation likelihood, and certain social variables like 
frequency of boat use and boat type also influence mitigation. Boat mitigation’s impact 
on evacuation timing is quite varied but does not seem to have a substantial impact. 
Finally, the qualitative data collected from the interviews provided crucial information to 
help explain the survey data and showed that both expensive and lower-cost marinas have 
effective hurricane plans. This will be influential to emergency mangers and insurance 
companies – who are financially invested in the protection of boats and marinas.  
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Tropical cyclones are one of the most destructive and costly natural hazards in the 
United States. There have been 31 separate billion-dollar events between 1980 and 2011. 
These events accounted for 47.4% of the damages from billion-dollar events for this time 
period (Smith and Katz, 2013). Within the broad category of tropical cyclones, those that 
reach hurricane status tend to be the most destructive due to higher wind speeds, with 
20% of hurricanes accounting for 90% of damages in the United States (Smith and Katz, 
2013). On average, about five hurricanes every three years make landfall along the 
Atlantic or Gulf Coast of the United States, two being major hurricanes (≥ category 3) 
(Blake et al., 2011). 
 Due to its Atlantic coastal location, South Carolina often falls victim to these 
events. Between 1987 and 2016, tropical cyclones accounted for 73.2% of the natural 
hazard losses in the state (SHELDUS, 2017). Between these years, Hurricane Hugo 
(1989) stands out as one of the most destructive events. Hugo originated off the coast of 
Africa before strengthening into a category 5 storm as it headed northwest (NHC, 2017). 
It passed through St. Croix, the Leeward Islands, and Puerto Rico before making landfall 
near Charleston, SC as a category 4 event. Hurricane force winds reached far inland with 
sustained wind speeds of 104 mph and gusts of 120 mph. The winds were coupled by a 
devastating storm surge of 20ft in some coastal areas (NHC, 2017). The event resulted in 




Notably, of the 13 people who died during Hurricane Hugo, five died while 
attempting to bring their boats inland (Bourque et al., 2006). Protecting boats is a serious 
concern during tropical cyclone events for boat owners, marina operators and crew, and 
insurance companies. For safety reasons, timing is critical following the issuance of a 
Hurricane Watch, as boats need to be either evacuated or heavily secured in time for the 
boat owners and marina crew to fortify their homes and evacuate themselves and their 
families (NOAA, 2002). While the hurricane evacuation literature is very comprehensive 
– covering topics such as evacuation logistics, evacuation timing, a household’s actual 
behavior compared to their predicted behavior given a hypothetical hurricane scenario, 
and the physical and social variables that affect a household’s probability of evacuating, 
the research addressing boat and marina mitigation practices is extremely limited. In 
particular, the literature has not examined the physical and social variables that affect an 
owner’s decision to take actions to mitigate their boat rather than abandoning it with the 
hope that their insurance will cover the losses. The research also does not address how 
boat and marina mitigation affects the ability of owners and marina crew to evacuate 
effectively. The purpose of this study is to fill the gap in the hurricane evacuation 
literature by looking specifically at the variables related to the decision of boat owners to 
mitigate and how this decision affects the evacuation behavior of the owners and their 
households.  
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research aims to determine the variables affecting boat mitigative actions and 
the extent to which boat owners and marina operators are uniquely affected by hurricane 
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events using surveying and interview methods between December 2018 and March of 
2019, this study is shaped by three main research questions.  
Q1: What are the physical and social variables that influence the decision to take the 
time to secure or move a boat prior to hurricane landfall? 
Q2: How does owning a boat impact a household’s decision to evacuate or affect the 
timing of the evacuation? 
Q3: How well do marinas comply with NOAA’s hurricane preparedness guidelines 
throughout the year and prior to landfall? 
1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters that each provide a different facet of 
information that aids in understanding the totality of the study. Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed literature review that covers the factors that influence evacuation response such 
as demographic variables, other social variables, and physical variables; evacuation 
logistics; special needs populations in the hazards context; and marina procedures and 
boat ownership. Chapter 3 addresses the materials used in the study; the survey 
development; the study areas – providing information about the marinas where surveying 
or interviews took place –; information about the data collection process – including the 
sampling methodology and a timeline; and it describes the statistical methods used to 
analyze the survey data. Chapter 4 expands on the previous chapter by including the 
results of the statistical analyses. Chapter 5 explains the qualitative process and results 
from the marina operator interviews, and it discusses these findings. Finally, Chapter 6 
discusses the results from the quantitative analyses, while bringing in information 
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gathered from the qualitative analysis to tie the results together. It also presents the 
conclusions to the research questions; introduces the limitations of the study; explains 
how the study’s findings should influence the way the hazards community views boat 
owners and marina crew during hurricane events; and finally gives suggestions for further 
research on the topic.
5 
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
In 1900, Galveston, Texas experienced one the most fatal natural disaster events 
in United States history when a hurricane resulted in 6,000 deaths (Baker, 1991). The 
fatalities from this event are unmatched by any proceeding event due to better warning 
systems and evacuation procedures (Baker, 1991; Bourque et al., 2006). In fact, no 
storms occurred between 1959 and Hurricane Katrina that resulted in more than 1,000 
fatalities, and while storm surge used to be the major cause of hurricane deaths, it now 
only causes 1% of the fatalities since people are out of the storm surge zones (Bourque et 
al., 2006). Despite the life-threatening risk, some people still choose not to evacuate even 
under a mandatory evacuation order (Baker, 1991). According to Baker (1991), 
“Evacuation rates vary from place to place in the same hurricane and from storm to storm 
in the same place” (pg. 291). Extensive research has sought to discover an explanation for 
the variations in evacuation rates and has revealed a complex intertwining system of 
physical and social variables that affect evacuation decisions at the household level. 
Throughout the literature, certain variables emerge as predictors of a household’s 
evacuation response including: specific demographic variables, whether or not the 
household received an evacuation order, hurricane characteristics, and past experience. 
2.1 FACTORS IMPACTING EVACUATION DECISIONS  
Demographic variables. Certain demographic variables have been found to 
influence evacuation response such as having children, gender, owning pets, and income. 
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Households with children and women are more likely to evacuate than their counterparts 
(Reininger et al., 2013; Bateman and Edwards, 2002). In contrast, households with pets 
are much less likely to evacuate (Heath et al., 2001; Edmonds and Cutter, 2008), and the 
impact of income and education is inconsistent with some studies showing these variables 
to be positively correlated with evacuation while others show them to be either 
insignificant or even negatively correlated (Hasan et al., 2011; Smith and McCarty, 2009; 
Hunt et al., 2012; Bowser, 2013.). These variables are explained in more detail below.  
Having children in the household greatly increases the likelihood of evacuation. 
In fact, some studies have found it to be the largest contributor to complying with an 
evacuation order – increasing the chance of evacuation by 50% (Hunt et al., 2012). The 
presence of children augments the perceived risk of the situation because they are a 
vulnerable population, and parents will take less risks with their safety (Fischer III et al., 
1995). Using a binary logistic regression model, Sarwar et al. (2016) determined that 
having two or more children in the household further increases this phenomenon – since 
an increase in children equates to a further increase in perceived risk as more children 
would be subjected to potential harm. In addition, households with children old enough to 
understand the situation may encourage the household to evacuate out of fear (Drabek 
and Boggs, 1968). It is important to note that families typically react as a unit during 
disaster situations (Quarantelli, 1985), and family members are unlikely to leave without 
the entirety of their family (Dow and Cutter, 2002). This means that children increase the 
likelihood of evacuation for the whole family, and parents are unlikely to split with one 
parent evacuating and the other staying behind. However, in a traditional nuclear family, 
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when this phenomenon does occur, the mother usually evacuates with the children, and 
the father stays behind to protect the property (Drabeck, 1969).  
The experiences of women during disaster situations have historically been vastly 
different than those of men (Bolin et al., 1998), and women are more likely to evacuate 
from hurricanes and other disasters (Bateman and Edwards, 2002). Understanding this 
gender discrepancy in evacuation rates is complex and is the result of various 
intertwining factors including: caregiving roles, a greater perception of risk, and thorough 
evacuation planning. Since women have been socially constructed to be caregivers, they 
are more likely to be responsible for taking care of vulnerable populations like small 
children, the elderly, and special needs individuals. In order to protect the vulnerable 
groups under their care, women have an increased likelihood of evacuating (Bateman and 
Edwards, 2002). In addition, women tend to have a more acute perception of risk than 
men – particularly White men (Slovic, 1987) – making them believe their residence is 
more at risk, pushing them to evacuate (Bateman and Edwards, 2002). Associated with 
this factor, women are more likely to have an evacuation plan, so in the event of a 
hurricane, they are more prepared to evacuate (Bateman and Edwards, 2002). However, it 
is important to note that some men are caregivers and have a keen perception of risk as 
well. In these cases, the men are significantly more likely than women to evacuate – 
leading to the distinction between intention and ability to follow through with that 
intention (Bateman and Edwards, 2002). This distinction stems from the “gender-based 
vulnerability” that has been created due to the “sociocultural systems that privilege men” 
(Bolin et al., 1998 p.41). Men typically have higher incomes, greater access to vehicles, 
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and more independence than women, which increases their ability to evacuate if they 
intend to do so (Bateman and Edwards, 2002). 
Owning a pet has consistently been shown to increase evacuation failure – which 
is a term used to describe when someone chooses not to evacuate –  as people do not 
want to leave their pets behind and taking them inflates the difficulty of the evacuation 
process (Heath et al., 2001). In fact, pets are associated with 20% – 30% of all evacuation 
failures (Heath et al., 2015). The logistics involved in evacuating pets, such as 
transporting and sheltering them, are major obstacles to evacuation, and these obstacles 
are augmented for people with multiple pets. Moreover, for childless households, 
evacuation failure nearly doubles for each additional dog or cat (Heath et al., 2001). 
Hurricane Katrina was particularly devasting for pets, as many people were forced to 
abandon them – resulting in between 40,000 and 50,000 lost pets (Hunt et al., 2012). 
Following this event, President Bush signed the Pet Evacuation and Transportation 
Standards (PETS) Act, which allocated funds to make pet friendly emergency shelters 
and evacuation plans for service animals. However, the effectiveness of this act has been 
questioned, as an informal study, conducted shortly after the Act was passed, revealed 
that 62% of respondents still reported that they would not evacuate because of their pets 
(Hunt et al., 2012). In contrast, a study following Hurricane Irene showed no significant 
differences in evacuation rates among pet and non-pet owners; however, of the pet 
owners who did not evacuate, most cited pet related reasons for their decision not to 
evacuate (Hunt et al., 2012). This illustrates that although the PETS Act has decreased 
the effect of pets on evacuation failure, they are still a strong consideration in making 
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evacuation decisions – indicating that efforts still need to be taken to further reduce this 
effect.  
Notably, local emergency managers need to educate the population about the 
available pet friendly shelters and provide disposal cat carriers and dog leashes to ease 
the burden of pet evacuation (Heath et al., 2015). In addition, Edmonds and Cutter (2008) 
presented a GIS model that estimates the number of pet owners who need assistance in an 
evacuation area. The model also shows the spatial distribution of these owners, so pet 
shelters can be strategically placed to maximize their utility (Edmonds and Cutter, 2008). 
These efforts are crucial to lessening the effects of pet ownership on evacuation failures – 
saving the lives of both humans and pets.   
The impact of income on evacuation decisions varies from study to study. For 
instance, in a behavioral evacuation mixed logit model, Hasan et al. (2011) found that 
higher income households and households with members holding a post graduate degree 
were positively correlated with evacuation. However, since more educated households 
usually are also higher income households, the researchers were concerned about 
multicollinearity – leading them to rerun the model, excluding one of the variables. This 
regression was not significantly different from the model containing both variables, 
indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue and both variables did increase 
evacuation (Hasan et al., 2011). While it is logical that higher income households would 
be associated with higher evacuation rates since they have the financial capability to be 
temporarily displaced for the duration of the event and would likely have easier access to 
vehicles, other studies show that income and education are insignificant (Smith and 
McCarty, 2009; Bateman and Edwards, 2000). Heath et al. (2001) even found that higher 
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educated households had an increased risk of evacuation failure. These inconsistencies 
are possibly due to the income and education variables being conflated with household 
type/location. More expensive houses are usually located near the coast (Baker, 1991) – 
forcing the higher income population to evacuate due to risk from storm surge; however, 
residents of mobile homes – which are typically part of the very low income population – 
have an extremely high evacuation rate due to the danger of being in an unstable mobile 
home during strong wind conditions (Whitehead et al., 2000). This means that income is 
a poor predictor of evacuation behavior and that household type and household location 
are far better predictors of response. 
Non-demographic social variables. Past experience is one of the strongest 
predictors of evacuation response; however, whether it increases or decreases evacuation 
likelihood depends on the intensity and recency of the past experience. In general, the 
odds of evacuating are higher for households who have experienced a major hurricane in 
the past compared to those who have not – especially if the experience occurred recently 
(Baker, 1991). For example, post Hurricane Floyd, Dow and Cutter (2000) looked at the 
evacuation decisions of coastal South Carolinians with a particular interest in the Horry 
County residents who had experienced six hurricanes over a four-year period – who they 
deemed “hurricane savvy.” Results show that 83% of the “hurricane savvy” residents 
(who were surveyed through the mail) evacuated compared to the statewide average of 
only 64%. Additionally, 17% of all coastal respondents cited past experience as their 
major reason for evacuating (Dow and Cutter, 2000). In contrast, a household that has not 
experienced a direct hit from a hurricane but has been on the outskirts of one or 
weathered a direct hit from a lesser storm may be less likely to evacuate because their 
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previous experience gave them the incorrect idea that hurricanes are not extensively 
destructive or dangerous (Baker, 1991). This “false experience” distorts the household’s 
view and makes them believe that they have experienced a major hurricane event and do 
not need to evacuate (Baker, 1991, p.302). According to Windham et al. (1997), the 
“false experience” leads to the experience adjustment paradox – which is the notion that 
new coastal residents more likely to evacuate than those who have lived on the coast for 
years since the new residents would not have had a “false experience” to alter their 
perception of a hurricane’s destructive capabilities (Baker, 1991, p.302). In contrast 
others believe that the longer a household resides on the coast, the more aware they will 
be of the destructive nature of hurricanes – resulting in an increased chance of evacuating 
when compared to newer residents (Baker, 1991). However, research reveals poor 
support for either theory (Baker, 1991), which makes length of residence an unreliable 
predictor of evacuation response. Overall, regardless of how long a household has resided 
along the coast, their likelihood of evacuating will be affected by their most recent past 
hurricane experience. 
Receiving an evacuation order and living in a high-risk area (coastal household 
with an elevation less than 10 feet above mean sea level) are the two biggest contributors 
to evacuation, and the two factors are highly linked since the populations who live in 
these high-risk areas are the people who are ordered to evacuate (Baker, 1991). 
Following Hurricane Frederick, researchers found that 84% of people who received an 
evacuation order evacuated compared to only 20% of people who did not receive an order 
(Baker, 1991). Even more shocking was the discrepancy in evacuation rates following 
Hurricane David with an 88% evacuation rate for people who received an order versus a 
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minuscule 8% for those who did not (Baker, 1991). Even though all evacuation orders 
increase response, mandatory evacuations are much more effective than voluntary ones 
(Whitehead et al., 2000). During hurricane Bonnie, people were three times more likely 
to evacuate if they received a voluntary evacuation warning; while, they were eight times 
more likely to evacuate when given a mandatory evacuation order (Whitehead et al., 
2000). This is due to the term “voluntary” not promoting the necessary level of risk, 
which is why mandatory orders need to be issued to generate a strong response. 
Physical variables. Unsurprisingly, tropical storm events that are ranked higher 
on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale result in a greater evacuation response because higher 
magnitude storms elicit a greater perception of risk (Sarwar et al., 2016). A behavioral 
study by Cutter et al. (2011) found that 76.6% of South Carolinian respondents reported 
their intention to evacuate for a major hurricane, while only 21% reported their intention 
to evacuate for a weaker storm. This factor can be problematic as the Saffir-Simpson 
metric only ranks storms by their wind speeds – not the storm surge or accompanying 
rainfall, so people may choose not to evacuate but still be faced with life threatening 
conditions. For example, Hurricane Ike made landfall in Galveston, TX as a category 2 
storm; however, the category 2 winds were coupled with the equivalent of a category 5 
storm surge (Huang et al., 2012). The storm caused 112 confirmed fatalities, another 300 
missing victims in the United States, and $31.7 billion in losses (Huang et al., 2012). 
When residents were interviewed after the storm, respondents claimed that “even though 
Ike was officially a category 2 storm, they thought it was higher based on the damage 
they saw” and that “Ike’s wind speeds or its rating on the Saffir Simpson scale did not 
accurately reflect the damage it caused” (Morss and Hayden, 2010, p.185). This shows 
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that wind speeds can be a flawed method for making an evacuation decision as a storm’s 
magnitude – or the strength of the storm (Cutter, 2005) – is not always congruent with its 
intensity – or the “subjective human experience of it” (Cutter, 2005, p.199). Due to this 
realization, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) began issuing storm surge warnings in 
2017 (NOAA, 2017). 
Interestingly, the correlation between the storm’s wind speed and evacuation rate 
is stronger between the storm’s maximum wind speed rather than its wind speed at 
landfall (Dow and Cutter, 2000). For instance, when Hurricane Floyd made landfall as a 
category 2 storm, there was an 84% evacuation rate for Horry County, SC – which is 
much higher than the response rate for past category 2 storms. This response stems from 
Floyd having almost been a category 5 storm while it passed through the Bahamas, with a 
maximum wind speed of 155 mph (Dow and Cutter, 2000). Table 2.1 illustrates the 
relationship between the maximum wind speeds of the six hurricanes, including Floyd, 
that affected Horry County between 1996 and 2000 and the evacuation rate in the county 
for each event – further showing this phenomenon.  
In addition to wind speed, location of landfall influences household evacuation 
decisions, as people who believe their household will receive a more direct hit from the 
storm have an increased likelihood of evacuating (Dow and Cutter, 2000). Hurricane 
Source: Dow and Cutter 2000 pg. 149 
     Table 2.1: Horry County Evacuation Survey Responses 
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tracks complicate this variable, as they are often misinterpreted and can change rapidly – 
leading to both evacuation failures and unnecessary evacuations (Bowser and Cutter 
2015). In a meta-analysis of 49 hurricane evacuation studies obtained from Google 
Scholar, Huang et al. (2016) found that location at landfall was a consistent and 
significant factor in evacuation decision making; however, by averaging the correlation 
coefficients from the 49 studies, it was determined that the variable only makes a 
moderate impact.   
2.2 EVACUATION LOGISTICS 
In addition to affecting the decision to evacuate, past experience also plays a role 
in certain evacuation logistics, such as evacuation timing and route planning. In regard to 
evacuation timing, there are many steps that must be completed prior to a household 
evacuation and predicting the amount of time each step will take is often difficult. These 
steps include the time it takes to prepare to leave work, travel from work to home, gather 
household members, pack travel items, protect property, and securing the home to leave 
(Kang et al., 2007). People’s ability to accurately predict how long it will take to 
complete each step varies significantly between steps. For instance, people are poor 
predictors of how long it will take to protect their house prior to evacuating; however, 
they can accurately estimate the amount of time it would take to pack travel items and 
secure the home (Kang et al., 2007). This discrepancy stems from people being able to 
compare packing and securing their home to going on a family vacation; whereas, people 
who have not experienced a hurricane in the past would not have a basis for estimating 
the amount of time it would take to fortify their homes with sandbags, shutters, etc. 
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(Kang et al., 2007). This illustrates that people use their past experiences to estimate how 
long it will take to evacuate. 
In terms of evacuation routes, a study by Wu et al. (2012) suggests most evacuees 
rely on their personal knowledge to pick the most time efficient, safe, and convenient 
route based on their past driving experiences instead of listening to recommendations 
from officials or using a navigation system. These findings are based on a survey of 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita evacuees that was conducted in 2006 by the Texas 
A&M University Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center (Wu et al., 2012). The study 
revealed that respondents who chose to rely on their past experience were less likely than 
other groups to accept outside route information to aid in their decision making, and 
demographically, White respondents were less likely than other groups to use any 
information in their decision making other than personal experience. Surprisingly, those 
who relied on past experience to choose their evacuation routes also reported shorter 
travel times than the other respondents – with those relying on official channels actually 
reporting the longest travel times (Wu et al., 2012). The overall reliance on past 
experience is leading to the routinization of evacuation routes and “suggests that repeated 
hurricane evacuations within a given area can begin to produce the development of the 
equilibrium traffic conditions associated with routine traffic patterns” (pg. 458). This is 
not to say that people will evacuate using the exact same route for every tropical storm 
event, but rather that people learn from each evacuation and use their past experience as 
the basis for choosing a route while still adapting to each specific storm. It is also 
important to note that these findings are the result of an individual study, so they should 
be viewed conservatively since they have not been verified by additional research.  
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Where people stay during the duration of the displacement is another heavily 
examined topic. In general people either stay with friends/family, go to a motel/hotel, or 
stay at a shelter –  with friends/family being the most common lodging type (Smith and 
McCarty, 2009). For instance, in the Hurricane Bonnie evacuation, 70% of respondents 
reported staying with friends/family (Whitehead et al., 2000) and later during the 2004 
hurricane season, around 60% of Floridian evacuees stayed in this type of lodging (Smith 
and McCarty, 2009). Staying in motels/hotels is the second most common lodging type 
and was the choice for almost 16% of the Hurricane Bonnie evacuees (Whitehead et al., 
2000). Choice of lodging is related to certain demographic variables including income, 
gender, and length of residence (Whitehead et al., 2000; Smith and McCarty, 2009). 
Higher income populations are more likely to choose to stay in a motel/hotel, and every 
income increase of $10,000 corresponds with a 2% increase in the likelihood of choosing 
to stay in a motel/hotel. Supporting this result is the finding that mobile home residents – 
who are a lower income population – are twice as unlikely than other groups to stay in a 
motel/hotel (Whitehead et al., 2000). These results are unsurprising since staying at a 
motel/hotel for multiple days can be expensive. Similarly, people who choose to stay in 
shelters are typically lower income populations, and White and more educated 
populations are unlikely to choose to stay in them (Whitehead et al., 2000). Women and 
pet owners are also a little more than one and a half times less likely to choose to stay in a 
shelter (Whitehead et al., 2000). As for choosing to stay with friends/family, people who 
have lived in an area for a longer period of time are more likely to choose this form of 




2.3 SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS  
The evacuation logistics, decisions, and experiences of special needs populations 
vastly deviate from those of the total population. In the hazards context, the special needs 
population is a broadly defined subset of people that includes groups that are typically 
thought of as special needs – such as individuals with disabilities – and other groups that 
are impacted differently than the rest of the population. These additional groups include, 
the elderly, tourists, college students, and small business owners, as each of these groups 
have evacuation impediments that do not affect the rest of the population.  
The elderly. The elderly population is considered a vulnerable subgroup of the 
population (Bowser, 2013); however, the literature is inconsistent about whether age is 
associated with evacuation response or evacuation failure (Bowser and Cutter, 2015). 
Much of these inconsistencies are likely due to the elderly being an ill-defined category. 
As noted in Bowser (2013), “[W]hat it means to be elderly has changed dramatically. The 
distance between the ends of an individual’s working life and their natural life has 
expanded, creating a considerably larger and more diverse group than had been initially 
considered by government planning in all aspects” (pg. 7). The experiences of the 
“young-old,” people between the ages of 65 and 74, will likely be quite different from 
individuals who are 75 and older. For instance, Bowser (2013) found that having an 
evacuation plan did not affect evacuation likelihood for those ages 75 and older, but it 
was still a strong predictor for the “young-old” population. This is likely because the 75 
and older portion of the elderly needs to rely on another source to evacuate, such as their 
family or a caregiver; while, the “young-old” still have the capability to take charge of 
their evacuation behavior (Bowser, 2013). It is also important to note that the frail elderly 
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have an increased chance of evacuation failure since evacuation lodging and 
transportation may not appropriately accommodate their needs (Bowser and Cutter, 
2015). This can also lead to an elderly individual’s caregiver choosing to stay behind to 
protect them (Bowser and Cutter, 2015) – placing both the elderly individual and the 
caregiver at risk from the storm. The elderly population is continuously growing, which 
makes understanding the evacuation experiences of this group particularly important and 
an area where further research is necessary.  
Tourists. According to Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray (2015), “Tourists are an 
at-risk group during a crisis because of insufficient knowledge to decipher 
communication messages and are typically in unfamiliar places and lack support systems 
accessible to them at home” (pg. 329). Examining the evacuation decisions and 
experiences of tourists is a relatively new phenomenon – with most of the past literature 
focusing on the impacts of a disaster on the tourism industry (Drabeck, 1995). In 
response to this gap in the literature, a group of researchers administered a series of 
surveys to Florida tourists between 2009 and 2011 (Matyas et al., 2011; Cahyanto et al., 
2014, Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015). Each survey used a variation of the same 
questionnaire that was altered to target the different research objectives of each study. 
These studies produced a great deal of valuable information about the physical and social 
variables that influence a tourist’s decision to evacuate (Matyas et al., 2011; Cahyanto et 
al., 2014) and the information sources most used by tourists to seek advice and 
evacuation instructions (Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015).  
The factors affecting tourists’ evacuation decisions mostly align with the factors 
that influence the evacuation decisions of residents. For instance, tourists were more 
19 
 
likely to evacuate from larger magnitude storms (Matyas et al., 2011); tourists with 
hurricane experience were less likely to evacuate (Matyas et al., 2011); and female and 
higher income tourists were more likely to evacuate than their counterparts (Cahyanto et 
al., 2014). The study also revealed that tourists with children perceived a significantly 
higher level of risk, but their likelihood of evacuation did not significantly increase 
(Matyas et al., 2011). Having a personal vehicle, rather than relying on a rental vehicle or 
air travel, was associated with increased evacuation (Matyas et al., 2011; Cahyanto et al., 
2014). This finding agrees with previous studies that found evacuees mostly rely on their 
personal vehicles, rather than carpooling or public transportation, and that not having a 
personal vehicle is a strong predictor of evacuation failure (Bowser and Cutter, 2015). 
Finally, international tourists were much more likely to evacuate than domestic tourists, 
likely since they would feel the least certain of their situation – resulting in a higher 
perceived risk (Cahyanto et al., 2014).  
International tourists also had vastly different opinions about information sources 
(Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015). They considered newspapers to be a more 
credible source of information than their domestic counterparts and were the most likely 
to use social media for their information (Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015); 
however, the use of social media as a credible news outlet is continuously growing in the 
United States, so this finding may no longer hold true. In regards to domestic tourists, 
television was the most popular information source, with both men and women ranking 
the Weather Channel as the most credible source (Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015). 
However, although this was seen as the most credible source, using it as the primary 
source of evacuation information did not affect evacuation decisions. Rather, evacuation 
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decisions were influenced by local authorities, the tourism office, and hotel staff – with 
the latter source decreasing evacuation and the former two sources increasing evacuation 
(Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray, 2015). 
Overall, tourists are in a unique position during a disaster since they are in an 
unfamiliar environment without a support system or knowledge of evacuation routes and 
procedures. Many tourists do not speak the language of the place they are visiting – 
putting them in an even worse position, as it is difficult to understand complex 
evacuation instructions with a language barrier. Tourists also may not have access to a 
personal vehicle – further decreasing their capability of evacuating. Although tourists 
have a variety of information sources, ranging from the Weather Channel to hotel staff, 
their lack of hurricane knowledge may hinder them from accurately deciphering the 
information and making an informed decision.  
College students. College students face many of the same challenges as the 
tourist population. For instance, they often are residing in an unfamiliar place, are away 
from their families, lack extensive hurricane knowledge, and in the case of international 
students, face language and cultural barriers (Van Willigen et al., 2005). Likewise, many 
college students do not keep cars on campus – forcing them to rely on public 
transportation (Bowser and Cutter, 2015), which as explained in the previous section, is a 
predictor of evacuation failure. Diverging from the tourist similarities, college students 
are known to live in low-rent areas – which tend to be more hazard prone –, and students 
usually do not have much disposal income – making evacuation a financial burden (Van 
Willigen et al. 2005). 
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The increased evacuation difficulty that arises from these factors is augmented by 
a lack of preparation on the part of colleges and universities. For example, during the 
Hurricane Katrina evacuation, 50,000 students were forced to evacuate, and post-
evacuation studies showed that 60% of surveyed students received no assistance from 
their educational institutions (Auletta, 2012). One student reported, “The evacuation 
process is one bad memory as a whole and was incredibly frustrating for most students on 
campus. More organization among the campus administrators and communication with 
students would have made this a less negative experience” (Ladd et al., 2007, pg. 55). 
Since students are away from their social networks, they really need the support of their 
college or university during a crisis; however, students are not receiving the support they 
need – making evacuation even harder.  
 Small business owners. In the face of crisis, small business owners have added 
concerns and preparations that affect their evacuation decisions and behavior (Morss and 
Hayden, 2010). Not only do small business owners have to secure their homes but also 
their livelihoods. This is a strong deterrence of evacuation because in addition to storm 
damage, many people fear “looting” of their homes and stores during disasters – even 
though rampant looting is just a myth perpetuated by the media (Tierney et al., 2006). In 
order to protect their businesses, owners often decide not to evacuate (Morss and Hayden, 
2010) – putting their lives and the lives of first responders at risk. 
In addition to being more likely to not evacuate, business owners have many 
factors to contend with post-storm that do not affect the rest of the population (Piotrowski 
et al., 1997). These owners need to get their businesses – their source of income – up and 
running in chaotic circumstances. The businesses often “lack electrical power, telephone 
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service, transportation access, and employees” (Piotrowski et al., 1997, pg. 1390). Most 
of these factors can be worked around through generators, cell phones, and other 
adaptations; however, the lack of employees cannot be avoided, as they need time to get 
their households back in order and focus on the well-being of their families. Another 
major problem is an inadequate number of customers (Piotrowski et al., 1997). Like the 
employees, customers need time to recover from the event, and they will not be 
patronizing shops and restaurants until they can get their affairs back in order. The lack of 
customers can be a prolonged problem if the business mostly caters to tourists, as the 
tourism industry is heavily affected post-disaster. For example, in Nepal – where 8.9% of 
its 2014 GDP relied on tourism – 90% of international trips were cancelled immediately 
following the 2015 earthquake, and throughout the next year, there was a 40% decrease 
in tourist activity (Hajibaba et al., 2017). This can be detrimental to small business 
owners since they cannot generate sufficient revenue without customers, and they are 
already financially strained from having to rebuild during the recovery phase of the 
disaster cycle. 
 Boat owners. Boats pose a substantial monetary loss to owners unable to mitigate 
damage prior to hurricane landfall – leading many to take extensive actions to either 
evacuate or secure their boat. These actions take a considerable amount of time, which 
may contribute to evacuation delays. Currently, there is no research addressing this 
question other than one sentence in Baker (1991), which states, “No other factors which 
have been tested have had much success [in predicting evacuation behavior]. Boat 
ownership, church attendance, operating home weather instruments, and total number of 
emergency preparations taken are some of the variables tested” (pg. 308). Although this 
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statement does not support the idea that boat ownership affects evacuation behavior, no 
research was cited after the statement, and since so many demographic variables affect 
evacuation inconsistently, it is important to dive deeper into this topic – especially since 
the article was looking at evacuation rates rather than evacuation timing. However, in the 
case of owners who use their boats for economic purposes, the likelihood of evacuation 
failure may be increased, since, like business owners, they may risk their lives to protect 
their livelihoods (Bourque et al., 2006). Ultimately, boat owners are more directly 
impacted by hurricanes, and they have experiences strictly unique to them – giving 
argument that they are a special needs population in the hurricane context.  
2.4 MARINA PROCEDURES AND BOAT OWNERSHIP 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the evacuation literature, research has not 
looked at how mitigating boats and marinas affects evacuation behavior. In fact, the 
mitigative actions themselves have not been well researched. For example, if FEMA’s 
website is searched for “marina mitigation,” an extensive list of titles appears; however, 
each title is simply a link to a brief paragraph about funding being allocated to rebuild a 
marina, and there is nothing about the actual mitigative actions or procedures 
(https://www.fema.gov/). While there are some pieces of grey literature about these 
actions, NOAA (2002) is the only academic source that comprehensively examines the 
guidelines and procedures necessary for a marina to successfully prepare for a hurricane. 
The manual goes through every stage of preparation, beginning with mitigating impacts 
by designing the marina to withstand hurricane winds and storm surge. The manual 
stresses the importance of educating boat owners on the preparation procedures and 
having practice sessions to make owners comfortable with evacuating their boat to a 
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“safe haven” and anchoring it in the safe location. The manual also stresses the 
importance of working quickly and starting preparations 72 hours in advance of landfall, 
so owners and employees can have time to prepare their homes for evacuation. Insurance 
and liability claims are also covered in the manual but not in great detail (NOAA, 2002).  
Mercante (1993) explains the intricacies of admiralty law, insurance claims, and 
the instances in which a boat owner or marina would be held liable for the damage to 
boats or other property. Mercante focuses on the “act of God” defense and the “force 
majeure” or “inevitable accident” defense. The “act of God” defense is invoked when 
“[a]ny accident [is] due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human 
intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been 
expected could have been prevented” (pg. 1055). Hurricanes are strong enough storms to 
be included in this category; however, in the case of damage to a third party – say if a 
boat comes loose due to high winds and collides with another boat – one must establish 
lack of fault unless the “act of God” is considered catastrophic enough that the damage 
would have happened even if the necessary precautions would have been taken. If the 
event is not deemed catastrophic, the “inevitable accident” defense must be invoked. This 
defense means that the boat owner took every necessary precaution to secure and protect 
the vessel, but the damage still occurred despite these efforts. 
Mercante (1993) provides examples of court cases in which the courts deemed the 
boat owners liable due to their lack of preparation, while other cases ruled in favor of the 
owners due to their efforts. It should also be noted that these court cases seem rather 
subjective because the court often determined the decision based on the owner’s marine 
experience and how much that owner would be expected to know about boat preparation 
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given their level of experience. Other possible liabilities include wreck removal and 
pollution charges due to leaking oil from wrecked vessels.  
Finally, the article discusses when a marina would be held liable compared to 
when the boat owner would be liable, and it explains the concept of the “safe haven 
hurricane clause” (Mercante, 1993) – which is included in some marina contracts. This 
states that when a hurricane warning is issued, owners must move their boats to a “safe 
haven,” or they will be held liable for all damages to boats, docks, etc. (Mercante, 1993). 
However, NOAA (2002) discourages marinas from having mandatory wet slip 
evacuations due to safety concerns – as it would be dangerous and unethical to force an 
owner to evacuate their boat if wind conditions were already unfavorable. 
2.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 As can be ascertained from the length and breadth of topics covered in the 
previous section, there is a vast array of research relevant to the thesis topic; however, 
most is not overtly relevant since research covering boat and marina mitigation or the 
effect this has on evacuation is poorly represented in the literature. However, even though 
there is a lack of previous research specifically on the topic, all the research presented in 
the previous section contributes to the background for the thesis. For instance, the social 
and physical variables affecting evacuation are extremely important to formalizing the 
question of how boat ownership interacts with these previously well researched variables 
to affect evacuation response. Evacuation logistics are important because they broaden 
the concept of evacuation behavior from simply “evacuate or fail to evacuate” to 
evacuation timing and the differences in how people evacuate in terms of lodging, 
transportation, and route. Timing is key to the thesis topic, as owning a boat may not 
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increase evacuation failure, but it may increase evacuation delays, as owners have the 
added burden of securing their boat prior to evacuation. Finally, understanding the term 
special needs population in the hazards context is critical to reaching the conclusion that 
the unique experiences of boat owners may make them an affluent special needs 
population during hurricanes. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This study used a mixed methods design that included quantitative and qualitative 
data and analysis. The materials for this study included a brief questionnaire created by 
the researcher and an outline of questions for semi-structured interviews that were 
conducted with marina and boatyard operators. A variety of parametric and 
nonparametric statistics were used to examine the quantitative data. The survey design, 
study areas, data collection, and statistical analyses will be explained throughout this 
chapter. 
3.1 SURVEY DESIGN 
The questionnaire was designed for the surveying of boat owners with the goal of 
understanding the variables that significantly influence the decision to mitigate boat 
damage prior to hurricane landfall and examining boat mitigation’s impact on evacuation 
timing (Appendix A). The questionnaire includes a series of fixed categoric responses 
including binary (yes/no), ordinal, and nominal questions. It also has two open ended 
questions, and a series of Likert scale questions that are mainly used for the hypothetical 
scenarios. Questions 1-10 address general boating questions like how long a participant 
has owned a boat (Q1), boat size (Q5), how the boat is used (Q8), etc. Questions 11-18 
begin to address boat mitigation – with question 11 directly asking how likely the 
participant is to take actions to secure their boat. Questions 19-30 ask whether the 
participant believes they would take mitigative actions given different hypothetical 
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hurricane scenarios that vary in hurricane wind speeds and landfall location – with the 
purpose of discovering the hurricane characteristics that influence mitigation decisions. 
Questions 31-41 ask questions about the boat owners’ past behavior and whether they 
took actions to mitigate boat damage in the past (Q33). The section includes questions 
about what specific actions the participants took to secure their boats (Q34), how many 
hours before landfall they began these actions (Q35), and how these actions affected their 
evacuation (Q37-Q41). The next five questions are general demographic questions that 
were used to examine the demographic variables that affect the decision to mitigate. The 
demographic variables, other social variables related to boat ownership, and storm 
characteristic variables from the hypothetical scenario section, were analyzed for their 
significance in impacting the decision to take mitigative actions – covering the first 
research objective. The final question asks, “Is there anything else you would like me to 
know about your experiences as a boat owner during tropical cyclone events?” This 
question is designed to allow owners to share specific experiences and information that 
may be important but are not covered through the structured questions.  
The survey was developed during the spring and summer of 2018, and it was pre-
tested at the Columbia Sailing Club on July 26, 2018 The pre-test was crucial to 
identifying problems with the survey’s flow and questions. The original survey was 
similar to the final version (Appendix A); however, a couple major changes were made. 
First, the original design included three different landfall locations for the hypothetical 
scenarios: Charleston, Myrtle Beach, and the Outer Banks. The pre-test showed that the 
last location was too far north for anyone to really consider mitigating, and it added too 
much time to the survey – leading to this section being removed from the final design.  
29 
 
The original survey also only offered answer choices for one boat, which caused 
confusion, as most of the pre-tested participants had multiple boats. To remedy this issue, 
the final survey offers answer choices for three boats – allowing participants to answer 
each boating question for up to three of their boats. Finally, the other major difference 
between the two surveys was not in the design itself but rather the administration. The 
pre-tested survey was administered by the researcher. This proved problematic for the 
Likert scale questions because participants tended to answer on the extremes (1 or 7); 
however, the few participants in the pre-test who filled out the questionnaire themselves 
were better about answering the Likert scale questions in the appropriate manner. Based 
on this observation, the researcher tried to have the participants in the final study self-
administer the survey. Some of the participants still requested to have the survey 
administered by the researcher because they were working on their boat; however, the 
majority took the survey themselves. 
3.2 INTERVIEW MATERIALS 
To explore the final research objective, the researcher conducted semi-structured 
interviews with the marina operators. A basic outline for the topics covered can be found 
in Appendix B. The topics included general marina procedures during tropical storm 
events – specifically focusing on the timing of preparations (Q2), owner responsibility 
(Q3), crew safety (Q7), etc. These interviews also addressed the mitigative actions that 
are taken during the rest of the season such as anchoring training (Q6), hurricane drills 
(Q5), and owner preparedness surveying (Q7). The questions asked were framed around 
the guidelines and procedures suggested in the “Hurricane Preparedness: Guidelines for 
Marinas” manual (NOAA, 2002) in order to assess how closely the marina operators are 
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following these guidelines and thus assess how effectively they are preparing the 
marinas. 
3.3 STUDY AREAS 
 Boat owner surveys. The surveys for this study were collected at the Cooper 
River Marina in Charleston, SC and the Belle Isle Yacht Club and Marina in 
Georgetown, SC. The Cooper River Marina is a public marina run by the Charleston 
County Parks Department (“Cooper River Marina,” 2019), and it can be seen in the aerial 
photo in figure 3.1. The marina was originally founded as a part of the Charleston Naval 
Base’s recreational facilities, but in 1995 it was acquired by the Charleston County Parks 
and Recreation Commission and turned into a public marina (“Cooper River Marina 
Project,” 2019). The 25-acre park site is conveniently located 15 minutes from downtown 
Charleston and 2 miles north of the Arthur Ravenel, Jr. Bridge (“Cooper River Marina 
Project,” 2019 and “Cooper River Marina,” 2019). The marina currently offers deep 
Figure 3.1: Cooper River Marina Overhead View ("Slip Fees," 2019) 
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water slips to both long term and transient boaters, and it has an on land boat storage area 
for trailered boats (“Cooper River Marina Project,” 2019). Long term slips range from 20 
ft to 40 ft, while the transient dock can accommodate boats up to 150 feet (“Slip Fees,” 
2019). The marina offers daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly leases at affordable rates 
(“Slip Fees,” 2019).  
Belle Isle Yacht Club and Marina is located just south of Georgetown, SC along 
the Winyah Bay (“Welcome to Belle Isle Yacht Club,” 2019). Unlike Cooper River, 
which, as previously mentioned, is a public marina, Belle Isle is a private, gated 
community featuring a yacht club, marina, condominiums, pools, and tennis courts 
(“Welcome to Belle Isle Yacht Club,” 2019). The community aspect of Belle Isle made it 
an ideal surveying location because almost every resident is a boat owner – providing a 
large population for sampling. 
The marina (which can be seen in fig. 3.2) features 80 slips, a ship store, and 
utilities, with the slips ranging from 30-50 feet (“Belle Isle Marina Amenities,” 2019). 
Figure 3.2: Belle Isle Marina (“Belle Isle Mariana Amenities,” 2019) 
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Notably, the marina was once considered premier due to it being the “closest full service 
marina location to the gulf stream in South Carolina” (“Welcome to Belle Isle Yacht 
Club”, 2019), however, the marina has been negatively affected by increased silt from 
flooding and Hurricanes Matthew and Irma. This has created a need for dredging, but the 
U.S. Coast Guard has decided not to take any more of these efforts, which has resulted in 
reduced hours for the marina as residents must “[access] the water around the tidal 
cycle.” The marina is currently undergoing a redevelopment plan that should reduce the 
need for dredging and restore the marina to a premier boat docking facility (“Welcome to 
Belle Isle Yacht Club,” 2019). Due to this factor, the surveying took place within the 
gates of the condominium community, which is where the yacht club is located.  
 Marina interviews. The interviews were with a manager from Charleston City 
Marina, Charleston City Boatyard, and Cooper River Marina. The first two locations will 
be discussed below, as the third was discussed previously.  
Charleston City Marina is a high-cost marina located in downtown, historic 
Charleston that includes many transient and permanent boaters, as the marina offers slips 
for nightly, weekly, monthly, seasonal, and annual leasing (United Landmarks Associates 
(ULA), 2013). It is the premier marina of Charleston featuring 19,000 feet of linear dock, 
covering 40 acres of water. It is home to the longest free standing floating fuel dock in 
the Southeast and was named the 2005 marina of the year by Marina Dock Age Magazine 
(ULA, 2013). 
Charleston City Boatyard is owned by the same company as the marina; however, 
it is located north of Charleston along the Wando River. The boatyard primarily offers 
repair services including fiberglass, welding, electrical, mechanical, and woodwork, 
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however, the boatyard also runs a hurricane haul program (“Welcome to the City 
Boatyard,” n.d.) which is a membership program that allows boat owners to have their 
boats hauled out of the water and tied down prior to a named storm. Figure 3.3 shows a 
sailboat being hauled out of the water at the boatyard. 
Overall these three interviews provide a comprehensive look at the marina 
hurricane preparedness process in Charleston, as the Cooper River Marina and the 
Charleston City Marina can be compared since the former is a public, lower cost marina 
and the latter is a premier facility – which could present differences in how the marina 
preparedness is handled. As for the final interview, although the boatyard is not a marina, 
Figure 3.3: Hauled Sailboat (“Welcome to the City Boatyard,” n.d.)  
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understanding the hurricane haul program is crucial to understanding the boat mitigation 
practices in Charleston. This interview ties the other two together, and the hurricane haul 
program was actually cited many times by boat owners at the Cooper River Marina for 
why they could or could not protect their boat during a storm – depending on their 
opinion of the program –, so this interview helps with analyzing the surveys, as well. 
Figure 3.4 shows a map of the all the study area locations. 
 
Figure 3.4: Map of the Study Areas 
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3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
The researcher gained approval from the USC Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
on October 10, 2018 (approval number Pro00083091) before collecting the data between 
December 2018 and March of 2019. For the survey portion of the study, the researcher 
walked around both locations requesting boat owners to participate in the study by 
completing the questionnaire either by the researcher reading the questions aloud and 
marking the answers or having the participant fill it out themselves – depending on which 
the participant preferred. The participants were selected randomly by a convenience 
sample and their willingness to participate in the survey, and the researcher gained 
informed consent before administering the survey. Most people who were approached 
were very willing to take the survey, resulting in about a 90% response rate. However, 
there were not many people at the locations, particularly the Cooper River Marina, so the 
process only resulted in 64 completed surveys (33 from the Cooper River and 31 from 
Belle Isle). The interviews were conducted either in person or over the phone and were 
audio-recorded, in order for them to be easily transcribed later. All the results were kept 
anonymous, and all ethical guidelines were followed. 
3.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 Descriptive statistics. The survey data was first analyzed using descriptive 
statistics in order to understand the makeup of the respondents in terms of traditional 
sample statistics such as age, race, gender, etc.; boating statistics such as length of boat 
ownership and boat type; and past mitigation and evacuation information. Much of the 
data is nominal, so percentages were used to describe the proportion of participants who 
chose each answer. This is particularly true for many of the boating questions and those 
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dealing with past hurricane experiences. In terms of sample statistics, the number of 
minors living in the household and age are the only ratio data; however, both of these 
variables were not normally distributed, so nonparametric statistics were still a better 
choice descriptively.  
 Composite Scores. Notably, other than the descriptive statistics, composite scores 
were used throughout the rest of the statistical analyses to compare the two landfall 
locations, storm magnitudes, and to correlate mitigation likelihood to a variety of 
different variables. These scores were created by summing the hypothetical hurricane 
scenario responses (Q19-Q30, Appendix A). Specifically, 9 different composite scores 
were created. Table 3.1 displays each composite score’s identifying name – which is how 
each score will be referred to throughout the rest of the document – and the questions 
whose responses were summed to create each score. For each score, the term likelihood 
refers to mitigation likelihood.  
   Table 3.1: Hypothetical Scenarios Composite Scores 
Identifying Name Responses Used 
Charleston Nonmajor Likelihood Q19+Q20+Q21 
Charleston Major Likelihood Q22+Q23+Q24 
Myrtle Beach Nonmajor Likelihood Q25+Q26+Q27 
Myrtle Beach Major Likelihood Q28+Q29+Q30 
Nonmajor Likelihood Q19+Q20+Q21+Q25+Q26+Q27 
Major Likelihood Q22+Q23+Q24+Q28+Q29+Q30 
Charleston likelihood Q19+Q20+Q21+Q22+Q23+Q24 
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Myrtle Beach Likelihood Q25+Q26+Q27+Q28+Q29+Q30 
Composite Likelihood Q19+Q20+Q21+…+Q28+Q29+Q30 
   
Non-Parametric Statistics. A variety of non-parametric comparative tests were 
used throughout the analysis of the survey data including: the Mann-Whitney U Test 
(Mann-Whitney), the Wilcoxon Signed Rank, the Sign Test, and the Kruskal Wallis. The 
Mann-Whitney is the non-parametric version of the independent t-test, so it was used 
whenever a condition was tested for differences between two independent groups – such 
as the two survey locations or participants who evacuated and those that failed to 
evacuate (Q38). The Wilcoxon Signed Rank and the Sign Test are non-parametric 
alternatives to the one-sample t-test and were used to test for differences within a sample 
under two different conditions. For example, these tests were used to check for 
significant differences between the Charleston likelihood and the Myrtle Beach 
likelihood scores and the nonmajor likelihood and major likelihood scores. The Kruskal 
Wallis is the non-parametric version of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), so it was 
used to test for significant differences when there were more than two groups. 
Spearman’s Rho (ρ) and Kendall’s Tau (τ) were used for a series of correlations 
that mostly sought to identify variables that were related to mitigation likelihood by 
correlating the various variables to the composite likelihood score. The correlations were 
run for continuous variables – such as number of children (43) – and ordinal variables – 
such as boat size (Q5), since these statistical methods are appropriate for both and none 
of the continuous variables were normally distributed. A correlation was also run 
between the composite likelihood score and question 11 – which if the first survey 
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question to address boat mitigation. It asks the participants to rank their likelihood of 
taking actions to mitigate damage to their boat prior to a hurricane without offering any 
storm characteristics. Correlating these two scores shows how well participants’ 
responses to a blanket question predicts their responses once the same question is broken 
into different scenarios. 
Multiple Linear Regression. The variables found to be related to the composite 
likelihood score, either through correlation or a difference in variance found through 
comparative testing, were combined to form a multiple linear regression model used to 
predict participants’ likelihood to mitigate through the proxy of the composite likelihood 
score. “Linear regression analysis is the most widely used of all statistical techniques: it 
is the study of linear, additive relationships between variables,” (Nau, 2018a, pg.1). It is 
represented by the following equation (eqn. 1), with Y denoting the dependent variable, 
X1-Xn denoting the independent variables, b1-bn denoting the slopes of the variables’ 
independent relationships with Y, and b0 denoting the intercept. 
Y= b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + …+ bnXn    (1) 
Binary logistic regression models are commonly used in hurricane evacuation 
studies to calculate a household’s probability of evacuating, so this study originally 
wanted to change that model from yes (evacuate) to yes (mitigate) or no (do not 
mitigate); however, after evaluating the data, it became clear that multiple linear 
regression is the better choice because combining the responses from each of the 
hypothetical scenarios provided a continuous dependent variable – the composite 
likelihood score. Also, multiple linear regression does not recommend quite as large a 
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sample size as logistic regression – furthering its betterment for this study. In particular, 
logistic regression requires 100 participants at the absolute minimum, and the minimum 
is often much larger, depending on the number of independent variables (Long, 1997). 
The sample size increases with the number of independent variables in multiple linear 
regression as well; however, the minimum is only 50 for testing the multiple correlation 
(VanVoorhis and Morgan, 2007). The suggested rule for calculating the needed sample 
size is illustrated in the equation below (eqn. 2), with m representing the number of 
independent variables (VanVoorhis and Morgan, 2007). Notably, a different rule only 
N > 50 + 8m (2) 
suggests at least 20 cases per independent variable – which means that the model is 
robust to a smaller sample size (“Assumptions of Linear Regression,” 2019).   
When dealing with multiple linear regression there are more assumptions to 
consider than in logistic regression. While both require little to no multicollinearity 
between the independent variables (“Assumptions of Linear Regression,” 2019), linear 
regression also assumes a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables, no auto-correlation, homoscedasticity of the residuals, and normality of the 
residuals (Nau, 2018b). If these assumptions are violated, the results of the regression 
model must be viewed conservatively, as the model will be subject to bias (Nau, 2018b). 
3.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 This chapter detailed the method used to craft the study. It explained the study 
materials – focusing on the survey design and development. It also provided insight into 
the marinas and boatyard that were used for surveying or interviews and briefly discussed 
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the data collection process. Finally, the chapter described the statistical analyses used to 
examine the survey data and expounded on why those analyses were chosen. The results 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
This chapter will present the results of the statistical analyses explained in the 
previous chapter. It provides the results of the descriptive, comparative, and correlational 
statistics before detailing the creation of the final multiple linear regression model. It 
defines the independent variables, provides the model summary, explains why two 
regression models were run, and validates the model through checking the assumptions. 
The chapter ends with a brief conclusion that summarizes the major results.   
4.1 DISCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Sample demographics. The study accrued a sample of 64 participants. Thirty-
three of the surveys were collected from Cooper River Marina, and 31 were collected 
from Belle Isle. Eighty-four percent of the participants are male (Q45, Appendix A, 
n=64), and the few female participants are evenly split between the two locations, with 4 
from Cooper River and 6 from Belle Isle. The participants are 98.4% White (Q46, n=64), 
with only one participant from Cooper River being Hispanic. The minimum age for the 
data set is 18, and the maximum is 79 (Q42). The mean age is 55; however, since the 
dataset is negatively skewed with more participants falling above the mean age than 
below, the median of 58 is a better representation of the central tendency. Seventy-seven 
percent of the participants did not have any minors living in the household (Q43, n=64), 
and the sample was very affluent with 50% of the dataset having an annual household 
income above $100,000 and only 26% of the dataset made below $60,000 (Q44, n=60) –
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which is notable since, according to the US Census Bureau (2018), the median household 
income in South Carolina is $48,781. 
Boating statistics. A majority of the boaters in the sample are experienced boat 
owners – in fact, 56% of whom have owned a boat for over 15 years (Q1, n=64). Figure 
4.1 shows the distribution of the years of boat ownership amongst the sample. In the 
dataset, it is also most common to own only one boat; however, 37.5% owned multiple 
(Q2, n=64). Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of the number of boats owned, ranging 
from one to eight. Motorboats are also the most common type of boat within the dataset 
with 45 participants owning at least one motorboat (Q4, n=64). Sailboats are more 
popular among the Cooper River participants since 21 of them own at least one sailboat 
compared to only 10 at Belle Isle. Figure 4.3 illustrates the number of sailboat owners to 
the number of motorboat owners and those that own both, and figure 4.4 divides the 















participants who own both into those who have one of each and those who have more of 
one over the other. Leisure and recreational fishing are the most common reasons for boat 
ownership in this dataset (Q8, n=64), with 39 participants claiming at least one of their 
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is used for recreational fishing. There are also four liveaboards in the sample whose 
primary use for their boat is a house. Finally, there are two participants who use one of 
their boats for racing, and one participant who commercially fishes. More than two-thirds 
of the participants reported that at least one of their boats has sentimental value (Q10, 
n=64).  
Past mitigation. Since much of the sample consists of longtime boat owners, it is 
unsurprising that 90.6% of the participants said their boat has been through a tropical 
storm or hurricane in the past (Q31, n=64). All but three claimed they took actions to 
mitigate boat damage for the storm (Q33, n=58). Out of the 55 participants that did take 
actions, securing the boat in its wet slip with ropes was the most reported answer with 
51% of the participants claiming to use this method (Q34, n=55); however, when you 
take out the participants who own motorboats, taking down the sail was cited the most 
with 86% of sailboat owners reportedly removing their boat’s sail in the past (Q34, 
n=28). Figure 4.5 shows the actions in terms of decreasing popularity, with securing the 
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boat in a dry slip with ropes being the least reported answer. It is important to note that 
the percentages do not add up to 100% since many participants marked multiple methods. 
Some participants also wrote additional practices such as having their boat hauled out; 
removing canvases, covers, and other miscellaneous items; and specifying that they use 
double lines and fenders when securing their boat in its wet slip.  
In regard to the timing of these past mitigative actions, 35% of participants started 
preparing their boats over 72 hours before hurricane landfall and only 9% waited until 
less than 24 hours to begin (Q35, n=55). Table 4.1 specifies the percentage of the 
participants who began taking protective actions for each of the time periods available on 
the questionnaire, and table 4.2 juxtaposes those percentages with those obtained from 






to note that question 13 will be referred to as the perceived level of procrastination in 
future analyses since its measuring how long participants think they will wait to begin 
mitigative actions. 
One of the three participants that did not mitigate damage in the past explained 
that he had been unaware of the approaching storm and was 300 miles out when the 
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Table 4.2: When Participants think 
they will Start Mitigating in the Future 
 
Table 4.1: When Participants 
Started Mitigating in the Past 
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storm hit. There was nothing he could do but ride it out, even though he claimed the 
waves were over 20 feet high. Interestingly, another participant who was caught at sea 
during a hurricane said he sought safe haven in a mangrove forest. They were the only 
two participants who reported ever having to ride out a tropical storm or hurricane on 
their boats. 
Evacuation. In addition to past mitigative actions, past evacuation behavior was 
also examined. Forty-one percent of the participants have evacuated for a hurricane in the 
past, 52% failed to evacuate, and 7% were on vacation when a tropical storm or hurricane 
approached, so they left the area but did not evacuate in the traditional sense (Q38, n=61).  
These evacuation rates can be compared to how participants think they will 
respond for future evacuations. This can be done through analyzing question 17 – which 
addresses how long participants think taking boat mitigative actions would delay future 
evacuations. For this question, only 6.25% of participants reported they would not 
evacuate (Q17, n=64), which is a stark contrast to the 52% who failed to evacuate in the 
past (Q38, n=61). When looking at the 57 participants who answered a time range (Q17), 
89.4% claimed taking boat mitigative actions would delay their evacuation less than 24 
hours. Figure 4.6 displays the distribution of perceived time delays due to taking actions 
to reduce boat damage (Q17, n=57). 
Of those who evacuated in the past, only three reported feeling they did not have 
enough time to prepare their home prior to evacuation (Q40, n=25), and the dataset 
indicates that taking boat mitigative actions does not impact the amount of time one has 
to secure their homes (Q41, n=45), as the mean for the 7-point scale is a 2.76 with a 
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standard deviation of 1.76. Notably, only 24% of participants who mitigated boat damage 
in the past prepared their homes before preparing their boats (Q37, n=55), and this is very 
consistent with the 25% of participants who planned to prepare their home before their 
boat for future storms (Q16, n=64). 
4.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 The hypothetical hurricane scenarios served to identify the physical variables that 
impact boat mitigation – particularly location and magnitude (Q19-30). Through the 
nonparametric, comparative analysis testing discussed in the methods section, it became 
apparent that both variables significantly influence mitigative actions. The Charleston 
nonmajor likelihood score was compared to the nonmajor Myrtle Beach likelihood score 
















Figure 4.6: Perceived Evacuation Delays from Boat Mitigative Actions 
48 
 
.01 level – with participants being more likely to mitigate for storms hitting near 
Charleston for both nonmajor and major events. When the storm categories’ scores were 
compared independently, rather than in the nonmajor/major composites, the Wilcoxon 
and Sign tests showed significant differences at the .01 level between the mitigative 
action scores at every storm category other than Cat 4 and Cat 5. For Cat 4 hurricanes, 
the Wilcoxon test showed a significant difference at the .05 level vs .01, although the sign 
test still indicated a significance at the .01 level. As for Cat 5 hurricanes, both tests 
showed no significant difference between the likelihood of taking mitigative actions 
between a storm predicted to make landfall near Myrtle Beach and one below Charleston. 
The tests also indicated a significant difference (p-value <.01) between the nonmajor 
likelihood score and the major likelihood score. This was also found true at the more 
deconstructed level when the Charleston nonmajor likelihood was compared to the 
Charleston major likelihood and the Myrtle Beach nonmajor likelihood was compared to 
the Myrtle Beach major likelihood.     
 The Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant differences between the likelihood 
to mitigate between the two survey locations. This was tested for storms predicted to land 
near Charleston and those predicted to land near Myrtle Beach, and both nonmajor and 
major hurricanes were tested– using the composite scores. This test was also used to test 
for differences in composite likelihood scores of men and women (Q45). The test 
revealed that women are more likely to mitigate; however, the test was not significant at 
the .05 level, but was at the 0.1 level. Since it was significant at the 0.1 level, the test was 
run for the Charleston likelihood score, the Myrtle Beach likelihood score, the nonmajor 
likelihood score, and the major likelihood score in order to see if the significance was 
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higher at a downscaled level. Each of these tests showed women being more likely to 
mitigate, but there was only a significant difference (p= .034) when looking at the major 
likelihood score. However, it is important to note that since there was only a sample size 
of 10 for women, these tests need to be viewed very conservatively. 
 The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare the differences in the composite 
likelihood score between participants who owned sailboats, motorboats, or both (Q4). 
The test was statistically significant at the .01 level for differences between the median 
composite likelihood score across boat type and at the .05 level for differences between 
the distributions of composite likelihood score across boat type. The Dunn-Bonferroni 
post-hoc test was run to compare the differences between each category. Figure 4.7 
shows a box and whisker plot comparing the median composite likelihood scores for each 
group. The only significantly different groups were sailboat and motorboat owners, with 
sailboat owners being significantly more likely to mitigate. Interestingly, participants 
Figure 4.7: Likelihood to Mitigate by Type of Boat – Box and Whisker Plot 
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who own both type of boats were still more likely to take actions than those that just 
owned motorboats – just not significantly so. 
4.3 CORRELATIONS 
 The composite likelihood score was correlated with a variety of continuous and 
ordinal variables in order to check for significant relationships. None of the traditional 
demographic variables showed any correlation, with age having a ρ= -.029 and a τ= -.045 
(Q42), number of minors having a ρ= .001 and a τ= .000 (Q43), and income a ρ= .106 
and a τ= .151 (Q44). In regard to boating questions, there was a weak relationship 
between the composite likelihood score and frequency of boat use (Q9, ρ= .349, p<.01). 
Surprisingly, there were only very weak relationships between the composite likelihood 
score and boat size (Q5, ρ= -.128; τ= -.092), sentimentality (Q10, ρ= .154; τ= .129), or 
length of ownership (Q1, ρ= -.122; τ= -.094), and none were statistically significant.    
Other variables associated with hurricane mitigation in particular were also tested. 
Question 12 dealt with the level to which the cone of uncertainty impacts respondents’ 
mitigation decisions, yet it had no correlation to their composite likelihood score (ρ= -
.038 and τ= -.042). There was a weak, positive correlation between the composite 
likelihood score and question 11 – the first question asking respondents to rank their 
likelihood of mitigating (ρ= .318 and τ= .384, p<.01). The correlation measures the 
relationship between the perceived likelihood of mitigating without knowing storm 
characteristics (Q11) and the likelihood of mitigating given context (Composite 
Likelihood Score), and a scatterplot illustrating the relationship is shown in figure 4.8. 
The level of perceived procrastination (Q13) is also weakly related to the composite 
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likelihood score, as participant’s who think they would wait until closer to landfall to 
start taking mitigative actions are less likely to mitigate (ρ= -.349, p= .005).  
4.4 MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION 
 Dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable for the 
regression model is the overall likelihood to mitigate – which is measured by the 
composite likelihood score. The independent variables are a combination of social and 
physical variables that were found to significantly relate to the dependent variable in the 
tests and correlations explained in the previous sections of this chapter. It took the 
analyzation of two regression models to decide the specific independent variables to 
include in the model. 
Only a few variables have a significant relationship with the dependent variable, 
so the number of independent variables in the model is low; however, since the sample 
size for this study is rather small, keeping the number of independent variables to a 
Figure 4.8: Relationship between the Composite Likelihood Score and Mitigation 
Likelihood without Storm Context 
Composite Likelihood Score 
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minimum helped the model be less biased. The independent variables used in the final 
regression model are type of boat owned (Q4), frequency of boat use (Q9), perceived 
procrastination level (Q13), and impact of location (Q19-30). The variable for type of 
boat was changed from sailboat, motorboat, or both to a binary variable – comparing 
participants who only owned motorboats to those who own at least one sailboat. This was 
done based off the Kruskal-Wallis post-hoc test that indicated that participants who 
owned both type of boats were not as likely to mitigate as those who only owned 
sailboats but were more likely than those that only owned motorboats. The impact of 
location variable was created by subtracting each Myrtle Beach category scale from 
Charleston’s corresponding scale; taking the absolute value of the differences; and 
summing those values to create a location level of impact score. This score indicates how 
much location played a role in participants’ answers to the hypothetical scenario 
questions.  
It is important to note that originally a similar measure to the impact of location 
variable was created for impact of magnitude, with the nonmajor likelihood score being 
subtracted from the major likelihood score to create an impact of magnitude value – as 
low scores indicated people who did not drastically change their likelihood to mitigate for 
stronger storms and high scores indicating people who did. When correlated to the 
dependent variable, this measure had a ρ= -.828 and a τ= -.699, basically indicating that if 
magnitude was a variable that a respondent considered when deciding whether or not to 
mitigate before an approaching storm, it played a major role in that decision. This 
variable was included in the first regression, resulting in an R2 = .796 and the F-statistic 
was 57.455. (p=.000). This shows how much magnitude impacts the mitigation decision; 
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however, this regression violated the assumptions of linear regression in terms of the 
normality and homoscedasticity of the residuals, so it had to be removed from the final 
regression. 
The independent variables included in the final regression model can be seen in 
the correlation table below (table 4.3). The collinearity statistics included with the SPSS 
regression output show all the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values to be between 1.00 
and 1.10 – meaning multicollinearity is not a problem in this model, as the lowest a VIF 
value can be is 1.   










Impact of Location 
Mitigation 
Likelihood 
1.00** .371** -.305** .340 -.428 




-.305** -.010 1.00 -.044 .285* 
Frequency of 
Use 
.340** .201 -.044 1.00 -.115 
Impact of 
Location  
-.428** .098 .285* -.115 1.00 
     *p<.05, **P<.01 
 Model Summary. The final regression model explains 42.9% of the variance in 
the likelihood to mitigate (R2 =.429). Although this seems like a low R2, it should be 
considered that human behavior is very hard to predict (MiniTab, 2013). The F-statistic 
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was 11.078, which is significant (p= .000). To visualize the model, the unstandardized 
predicted values created by the regression equation were plotted against the overall 
mitigation likelihood score – creating a scatterplot showing the predictability of the 
model (fig. 4.9). 
To account for possible sampling bias in the model, a very basic bootstrapping 
technique was used. Ten different regressions were run – each with 50 random cases 
from the dataset. Table 4.4 displays the summary statistics for each regression. The 
median R2 for the 10 trials is .437, which is slightly larger than the R2 for the whole 
dataset. To provide a confidence interval, the value of at the 25th percentile is .423 and 
the value at the 75th percentile is .464, meaning that 50% of the possible R2 values for this 
dataset will fall between these two numbers. These results indicate that the sample may 























Figure 4.9: Model R Depicted as a Scatterplot 
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the median; however, it is important to note that only 10 trials were run for the 
bootstrapping, which is much lower than normal and may have skewed the results. 
                               Table 4.4: Bootstrapping Trials 
Trial Number R2 F-Statistic 
1 0.427 8.377 
2 0.419 8.129 
3 0.446 9.052 
4 0.400 7.499 
5 0.461 9.61 
6 0.439 8.796 
7 0.531 12.712 
8 0.424 8.279 
9 0.435 8.651 
10 0.472 10.052 
 
Assumptions of Linear Regression. As mentioned in section 3.5 of the study, 
five main assumptions must be met for this linear regression to be valid – no 
multicollinearity, the independent variables must have a linear relationship to the 
dependent variable, no autocorrelation, homoscedasticity of the residuals, and normality 
of the residuals. Multicollinearity was assessed earlier in this section, when the VIF 
values were analyzed, and the independent variables were checked for a linear 
relationship, by examining their scatterplots, before they were ever included in the 
regression model – meaning autocorrelation and the residual assumptions are the only 
ones left to examine.  
The model was checked for autocorrelation by running the Durbin-Watson test – 
producing a value of 1.905. This value is very good because a Durbin-Watson value of 2 
indicates no autocorrelation. The last two assumptions are checked by analyzing plots 
created in the SPSS output, and these are the assumptions the first regression failed to  
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pass. Normality of the residuals is analyzed using the P-P Plot, which plots the observed 
cumulative probability against the expected cumulative probability. In a perfect P-P plot, 
the observations are plotted in a diagonal line without many deviations – indicating a 
normal distribution of the residuals. In the plot for this model (fig. 4.10), the observations 
are in a line for the most part, other than one deviation in the middle. Although the plot is 
not perfect, data is hardly ever perfectly normal, so this assumption can also be upheld.  
Finally, the test for homoscedasticity involves analyzing a scatterplot of the 
regression standardized predicted values against the regression standardized residual 
values. This plot is supposed to show no relationship, with observations being evenly 
dispersed around the center horizontal and vertical lines. The plot for this model is shown 
Figure 4.10: P-P Plot 
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below in figure 4.11, and the observations appear random and evenly spread – meaning 










4.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented all the results from the analysis of the survey data. Some 
of the major findings include the relationship between type of boat owned and mitigation, 
with sailboat owners being more likely to take mitigative actions. The findings also 
showed relationships between the frequency of boat use and the level of perceived 
mitigation procrastination to the likelihood to mitigate. Surprising variables like boat size 
and sentimentality were not related to mitigation, and unsurprising, location of landfall 
and storm magnitude did have a significant influence. The created regression model was 
able to explain 42.9% of the variance in mitigation likelihood, and the results of this 
model, as well as the other results from the statistical analyses, will be discussed and 
interpreted in the discussion and conclusion chapter of this study.
 





















Figure 4.11: Standardized Residuals vs Standardized Predicted Values 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 This chapter goes through the entirety of the qualitative analysis portion of the 
study. It briefly explains the interview methods and how the interviews were analyzed 
before detailing the results of the analysis. The chapter also discusses the results and 
draws conclusions that will later be used in the discussion of the overall study. 
5.1 METHODS 
Three 15-minute semi-structured interviews were conducted with marina and 
boatyard managers in Charleston, SC in order to form a comprehensive view of the 
marina hurricane preparedness procedures in the area. The interviews for the Cooper 
River and Charleston City marinas were compared – looking particularly at their 
hurricane plans. The interview with the manager of the Charleston City Boatyard was 
especially enlightening, as it shows the business side to hurricane preparedness in the 
area, and it ties the two marina interviews together. All of the interviews were based off 
questions created from NOAA’s Hurricane Preparedness Guidelines for marinas and 
sought to examine how closely the marinas’ hurricane plans aligned with the guidelines 
present in this manual (2002). Anecdotal evidence is also presented that helps to 






Charleston City Marina. The interviewee at this marina actually allowed the 
researcher to have a copy of their formal hurricane plan, which can be found in Appendix 
C. The plan is very comprehensive and specific. It is broken down into the tasks and 
procedures that need to be implemented once a hurricane watch is issued and those that 
need to be implemented once they move into a hurricane warning. The manager updates 
and reviews the plan with the staff every March.  
During the hurricane watch period, the staff sends out an email via MailChimp to 
all the tenants – informing them of the approaching storm, providing them a checklist of 
what they need to do to secure their boat, either in its slip or through evacuation, and 
asking them to let them know if they plan to evacuate their boat. They also send them the 
contact information for the three boatyards in the area, in case the owner will want their 
boat hauled out. Larger vessels are sent a questionnaire, requesting the owner or captain 
to inform the marina about the plans for that vessel. The emails also include the date and 
time that utilities to the marina will be shut off, and signs are also placed around the 
marina with this information. During this time, the marina also closes to transient boaters 
because it is common for boaters from other marinas to try and move their boat to more 
protected marinas when a storm is approaching – which the interviewee says, “can cause 
a lot of problems.” They also do a lot of miscellaneous tasks such as securing trashcans, 
carts, flags, signs, and other loose objects; fueling all vehicles and equipment; and 
stopping the bus that usually runs between the marina and downtown.  
The procedures allocated to the hurricane warning time period are much more 
extensive and are divided into marina, marine fuels, sea store, parking, and office (see 
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Appendix C). It continues with a lot of the procedures from the hurricane watch period, 
in regard to securing loose objects, but this is extended – with benches being moved 
inside; golf carts and company vehicles being moved to a parking garage; and the happy 
hour tent being completely taken down. Electronics are moved away from windows and 
computers are moved to an upper level and placed on the floor. Inventory is raised; 
sandbags are placed in front of doors; and storm shutters are installed in the office. The 
marinas’ boats are taken to the City Boatyard to be hauled out; fuel tanks are topped off; 
and dispenser nozzles are zip tied, before the power and water is shut off to the docks.   
The boaters are not required to evacuate their vessels from the marina, although it 
is highly recommended. This is consistent with the NOAA guidelines (2002), as it can be 
very dangerous to force boaters to leave before an impending storm. According to the 
interviewee, years ago at a marina conference, he heard a story about a couple who died 
trying to move their boat. “[The] hurricane was coming, and the marina forced them to 
leave, and they really didn’t have a safe haven to go to and ultimately they got caught up 
in some of the storm. The boat capsized and sank, and they died.” The marina was found 
responsible for their deaths, and a maritime law was created which prevented marinas 
from forcing owners to evacuate their boats. This anecdote was further researched and 
found to be true; however, the law is exclusive to Florida and was passed after Hurricane 
Andrew, when many boaters were placed in harm’s way by marina contracts (Brais, 
2010).  
The marina has a tiered program for marina staff in regard to when they are 
allowed to leave and reenter before and after the event. For the majority of the staff, they 
are allowed to leave whenever a mandatory evacuation order has been issued; however, 
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there is an executive team that stays until the marina is completely secured. The marina 
pays for that team to stay in a hotel, and they have a letter from the governor – allowing 
them to come back to the city before the evacuation order has been lifted to start 
accessing damages and reopening the facility.  
 Cooper River Marina. Charleston City was the only marina that provided a copy 
of their materials, so the tasks and procedures explained in this section are slightly less 
specific since all the information comes from the interview; however, the plan is very 
thorough, and preparations are started way in advance of landfall – making it very 
effective.  
The plan is segregated into five levels of preparedness. The marina stays in level 
five year-round, and it involves normal maintenance like stocking up on extra 25-foot 
lines and maintaining the equipment. The interviewee also reviews the plan with the staff 
at the beginning of each hurricane season, and emails are sent out to patrons reminding 
them that the season has arrived. Ninety-six hours in advance of a storm, the marina 
moves to level 4. At this point, all the staff is made aware of the threat, and another email 
is issued – informing the patrons. According to the interviewee, “Honestly, lots of 
customers don’t pay attention to the news or the weather, so they have no idea 
something’s out there until we tell them.” The fuel tanks are topped off, and the staff 
checks to make sure the facility is draining correctly – to mitigate flood risk. Within 72-
48 hours of predicted impacts, a third email is sent – telling patrons to really watch the 
storm and start preparing. During this time, all loose objects such as fire extinguishers, 
benches, food, merchandise, and other park equipment are secured inside the dock office. 
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Level 3 begins when a hurricane watch is initiated. Patrons are reminded that they 
are not allowed to stay on their boats after the park is closed; all hazardous materials are 
locked up; and the pump boat is taken out of the water and secured on land. The marina 
also ties down boats that have not been mitigated with 25-foot lines. Level 2 is 24 hours 
before the staff leaves, which is earlier than 24 hours before landfall – since the marina 
closes with county parks. This level involves final checks, bringing in trashcans, and 
leaving. All of the staff is gone more than 24 hours before landfall. Finally, level 1 is 
their re-entry protocol. The marina reopens with county parks – which basically is as 
soon as the storm passes, since they are considered essential personnel.  
The marina does not provide any information to boaters about local hurricane 
holes – which are protected coves or inland creeks/lakes where a boat can be anchored 
during a hurricane – and most of the boaters choose to secure their boats in their wet slip. 
According to the interviewee: 
“You can go up the Cooper River to the lake or up the Wando River, but you have 
to call way in advance to get the bridge lifted. Some of the smaller boats who can 
sail under the bridge will do that… There is [also] a hurricane haul program but 
it’s so expensive and moving the boats is so time consuming, so most people, who 
actually do something, just tie them with double lines and take off the sails and 
canvasses. I think it’s partially due to our marina being at the lower end of the 
price range for marinas in the area.” 
As previously mentioned, the marina will tie down boats for the owners that did not take 
any mitigative actions; however, they tell the patrons that they will not in order to 
encourage more owners to take actions themselves. The interviewee explains, “[M]ost 
people who use their boats regularly will take actions, but some people have had their 
boats here for over two years, and I have never seen them. Those people never do 
anything.” The interviewee proceeded to tell a story of a patron he had never seen who 
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called and complained before Hurricane Irma because he did not think the marina had 
informed him of the threat in enough time to secure his boat. The marina secured the boat 
for the patron with double lines, and today those double lines are still there because the 
patron has not been to the boat since Irma in 2017. 
 Charleston City Boatyard. During normal operations, the boatyard is 
responsible for repairing boats; however, when a named storm is approaching, the facility 
shuts down normal operations and focuses on their hurricane haul program. The 
interviewee compares the program to insurance – saying, “Basically, the first payment 
[initiation fee] is like your premium, and each time there is a named storm, you pay your 
deductible for other things.” Specifically, each year boat owners can sign-up and pay a 
fee to be put on a list of boats that can be hauled out in the case of a named storm. If 
someone is not on the list, they cannot get hauled out. Once on the list, members pay for 
a haul block and launch each time they are hauled out for an event. They are also charged 
lay days, while their boats are on the land – specifically a dollar per foot per day. The 
hauled boats are tied down with straps attached to helical anchors that are imbedded 4-
feet in the ground with an auger. The boatyard is located up the Wando River, so wind is 
the main concern rather than surge, so the straps keep the boats from knocking into each 
other, as they are all packed in tightly, or from falling over. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show the 
boatyard during Hurricane Mathew in 2016, with the former providing a close-up view of 
the hauled boats, and the latter providing an aerial view of the yard. 
In order for a member to have their boat hauled, they must have the boat to the 
boatyard’s dock before a hurricane watch has been issued for Charleston. If the boat hits 
the dock after the watch has been announced, the boatyard is not obligated to haul the 
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boat. The staff tries to be proactive and begins calling members as soon as there is a 
chance of a storm coming towards the East Coast. They try to get members to start 
thinking about the storm early because “any two, three, five boats that [the staff] can get 
out early before the rush is helpful.” The yard can haul between 35 and 40 boats, and the 
Figure 5.2: Aerial View of the Charleston City Boatyard during 
Hurricane Matthew (Charleston City Boatyard Interviewee, 2018) 
Figure 5.1: Boats at Charleston City Boatyard during Hurricane Matthew 
(Charleston City Boatyard Interviewee, 2018) 
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process takes about 40 hours, longer if there are many larger vessels. Once the yard stops 
normal operations and shifts only to hurricane hauls, the yard is working 24 hours a day. 
Light plants are brought in, and the staff is divided into shifts – some of which is more 
structured than others. For instance, the employees running the lift have very structured 
hours since they are operating heavy machinery, and they can make mistakes that cost 
serious money. Most of the employees are on 8-10 hour shifts; however, they are allowed 
to put in as much overtime as they want – meaning if someone wants to work 16 
consecutive hours, they can. The interviewee says he “usually ends up working about 20 
hours in a row.” The whole staff is usually able to leave 24-30 hours before any tropical 
force winds.  
 The boatyard also calls the patrons whose boats are already at the facility being 
serviced and offers to tie down their boat with the straps and anchors for a cost. They also 
offer to remove canvases from these boats, but that work can get overwhelming, so they 
prioritize the boats of regular customers and those with a lot of canvas. More dilapidated 
boats are typically left to the end, but the staff still offers to strap them down to keep 
them from falling on other boats.  
 Finally, the interviewee also provided some information about hurricane holes in 
the area and common practices amongst boat owners in regard to mitigation. The 
interviewee reiterated that “many people pay their insurance and walk away;” however, 
he also said, “[A] lot of people make the extra effort when they can’t get hauled out to 
make their boats safe” by “[tying] eight extra lines on their boat, put[ting] out extra 
fenders, and tak[ing] off sails and canvass.” He also explained that historically there have 
not been many hurricane holes around Charleston, but the bridge crossing the Wando 
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River was raised this year from about 20 feet to 55 feet – meaning boats can now go up 
the Wando River to many creeks and anchorages that used to not be accessible. 
5.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The information provided by this analysis shows that both the Charleston City and 
the Cooper River marinas have very effective hurricane plans; however, neither offer any 
educational programs to boat owners about local hurricane holes, as suggested in the 
NOAA manual (2002). Although, the Charleston City Marina does provide their 
customers with the contact information for the three boatyards in the area – in case the 
customer wants to have their boat hauled out. It is important to note the marina did not 
only provide the information of the boatyard it is affiliated with – indicating a desire to 
actually educate the patrons on their options rather than simply sending them to the 
boatyard it would profit from. Neither of the marinas mentioned having hurricane drills, 
but since there has been a storm every year for the last few years, it would not seem 
necessary to have drills anyways.  
Markedly, the Charleston City Marina is considered the gold standard in marina 
preparedness, but this may largely stem from their clientele because Cooper River’s 
hurricane plan is just as comprehensive as the one for Charleston City. In fact, Charleston 
City does not start preparing for a storm until a hurricane watch (48 hours before landfall) 
versus Cooper River, which begins preparations 96 hours before landfall. The plans also 
specify very similar tasks, and both marinas’ managers review the plan with the staff 
annually. Cooper River actually reviews the plan twice – once in February, when every 
staff member brings a copy of their plan from the previous year with notes about how 
well the plan worked and what could be improved, and once before the start of the 
67 
 
hurricane season to review the revised plan that was updated based off the notes from the 
staff members in February. The marinas are also similar in the level of communication 
they have with their patrons in regard to an approaching storm. Both marinas send out 
emails in advance of the storm; however, Charleston City also sends out a checklist to the 
owners to help guide them in properly securing or evacuating their boat. In contrast, 
Cooper River does not send out a similar document, but the staff stays in constant 
communication with their patrons throughout the process – urging them to mitigate their 
boats in a timely manner. Overall, the differences in these two marinas lies in their 
customers. Charleston City’s customers can afford to be members of the hurricane haul 
program – meaning many of the boats in the marina will be evacuated. In contrast, as 
quoted in the Cooper River section, the hurricane haul program is too expensive for many 
of Cooper River’s patrons – forcing people to secure their boats in their slips, and 
customers who do not frequent their boat, are unlikely to take any actions at all.  
The boatyard interview provided crucial information that helped to understand the 
differences in boat owner mitigation practices between the two marinas. It also 
highlighted the industry aspect of the Charleston hurricane scene, as companies are able 
to charge high prices to offer protective services. The program, while effective at 
mitigating boat damage, is only really accessible to the wealthy. This is particularly a 
problem since according to the boatyard and Cooper River interviewees, there are not 
many hurricane holes near the area; however, now that the Wando River bridge has been 
raised, maybe more boaters, who cannot afford to have their boats hauled, will be able to 
move them to safety.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This is the final chapter of the document, and it begins by mostly discussing the 
quantitative results from chapter 4. It is specifically placed after the qualitative analysis 
chapter because some of the results from chapter 4 can better be explained in context 
through the information learned in chapter 5. The chapter then addresses the research 
questions, explains the study limitations, provides suggestions for future research on the 
topic, and discusses the study’s significance to the hazards community. 
6.1 OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 Discussion of descriptive statistics. As was illustrated in figure 4.5, 51% of 
respondents would secure their boat in their wet slip versus only 29% who cited moving 
their boat to a hurricane hole. This can better be understood after learning in the 
interviews that there are not many accessible hurricane holes around Charleston. Notably, 
of the 26 participants who said they would move their boat to a hurricane hole, 9 
specified they would “haul out” or “pull out” their boat rather than anchoring it up river. 
This accounts for only 14% of the dataset, and five of the nine respondents who claimed 
they would have their boat hauled were from Belle Isle – which is interesting because 
there are more accessible hurricane holes around Georgetown. However, the boatyard 
interview shed light on how expensive it is to have a boat hauled in Charleston, and the 
Cooper River interview highlighted that many of its tenants cannot afford this expense – 
which is likely why so few Cooper River respondents use this method. 
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 It is also interesting to examine the timing of when respondents think they will 
begin taking mitigative actions to when respondents started taking these actions in the 
past. In table 4.1 and 4.2, the percentage of respondents who said they would begin 
actions during each possible time period were compared to the percentage of respondents 
who began taking actions during each period in the past. These tables show that more 
participants expect to begin taking mitigative actions earlier than what respondents did 
during their past experiences. This could mean that people perceive their level of 
procrastination to be less than it actually is, or it could mean that people have learned 
from their past experiences and realized it is better to start taking these actions earlier.  
 Similarly, respondents’ past evacuation rates did not align with question 17, 
which asks participants how long mitigative actions would delay their evacuation and 
offers the option of “would not evacuate.” Only 6.25% of the participants chose that 
option, which is quite different from the 52% of the participants who failed to evacuate in 
the past. This difference, like with the mitigation procrastination, could be due to 
participants learning from their past experiences and deciding to evacuate in the future. 
Response bias – which will be discussed more thoroughly in the limitations section of 
this chapter – is another possible explanation, as social-desirability – a type of response 
bias that will also be explained in the limitations section – may have played a role in the 
respondents’ answers.  
 Still dealing with question 17, 89.4% of the participants thought taking mitigative 
actions would delay their evacuation less than 24 hours (n=57). The largest proportion of 
participants (26%) believed taking these actions would not delay their evacuation at all, 
and another 23% thought it would cause less than a three-hour delay. These statistics 
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would suggest that having a boat does not cause a substantial effect on evacuation; 
however, a different 33% of the participants thought taking actions would postpone their 
evacuation by over six hours (23% – 6-12 hours, 7% – 12-24 hours, 3% – over 24 hours, 
n=57). This is a considerable length of time when considering how hectic and fast-paced 
hurricane evacuations can be. When a large number of a county’s population is leaving 
an area at around the same time through similar routes, traffic becomes a serious issue, 
and having a quarter of a day to a full day delay may put boat owning families at a slight 
disadvantage for getting out of the hazard areas in a timely manner.  
Discussion of comparative and correlational analyses. Markedly, respondents’ 
perceived level of procrastination was found significantly correlated to the composite 
likelihood score through an indirect relationship. This means that respondents are less 
likely to mitigate, when they plan to wait to the last minute before taking actions.  
Another area in which participants’ perceptions can be compared is question 11, 
which directly asks participants how likely they are to mitigate boat damage, and their 
composite likelihood score. This relationship had a significant positive relationship; 
however, the ρ= .318 is not a particularly strong correlation, especially when one 
considers that these two values are supposed to be measuring the same construct, 
likelihood to mitigate. What this correlation really indicates is that people believe they 
are much more likely to take mitigative actions than they actually are once physical 
variables are applied to the question. As can be seen in the scatter plot of the relationship 
in figure 4.7, most participants answered question 11 at the extreme 7 instead of thinking 
about the question and realizing that not all tropical cyclone events are equal, and they 
are not going to take the same actions for storms of differing magnitudes and landfall 
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locations. What also can be seen in the scatterplot, however, is a very strong relationship 
between the composite likelihood score and the question 11 score for participants who 
contemplated the initial question and answered not on the extreme. 
In reality, physical variables significantly impact respondents’ likelihood to 
mitigate, with a significant difference existing between the likelihood to mitigate between 
nonmajor and major storms and between storms landing near Charleston versus Myrtle 
Beach. This is not surprising given how much magnitude influences the decision to 
evacuate (Cutter et al., 2011; Sarwar et al., 2016) and that location of landfall has been 
found to significantly and consistently influence evacuation as well (Huang et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, no significant difference was found between the two survey locations in 
regard to their likelihood to mitigate for either landfall location. This is notable since 
Belle Isle is located in Georgetown – which is about equidistant between Charleston and 
Myrtle Beach, so one would think that respondents from Belle Isle may be more likely 
than those in Charleston to take mitigative actions for storms expected to hit Myrtle 
Beach. The fact that boaters in Georgetown are not any more likely than Charleston 
boaters to mitigate for storms hitting Myrtle Beach potentially indicates that boaters 
understand the heightened impacts of the front right quadrant of a cyclone and know that 
a storm hitting right below them will likely be more destructive than a storm landing 
above them. This may suggest that boaters have a greater hurricane knowledge than the 
general population, which is logical since boaters – especially sailors – must have a basic 
understanding of atmospheric dynamics.  
Notably, sailors had a significantly higher composite likelihood score than 
motorboaters. This could be due to sailboats being more vulnerable to tropical storm 
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force winds due to their masts and sails; however, it is also possible that there is an 
inherent difference between sailboat and motorboat owners. As mentioned previously, 
sailing requires a knowledge of the atmospheric sciences, and it needs a level of physical 
skill that is not needed to operate a motorboat. This means that even though the sailboat 
owners in this dataset mostly used their boats for leisure, just like the motorboaters, the 
sailboat owners needed to put more time into their boat and likely view their ability to 
sail as a talent – which they would want to preserve and would likely raise their 
appreciation for their vessel.  
There was also a positive correlation between respondents who used their boats 
more frequently and their composite likelihood score. Again, this is not surprising 
because – like the explanation for sailboat versus motorboat owners – people who put 
more time and effort into their boat will have a greater devotion to that boat, and it will 
be more important to them. As was quoted in the Cooper River subsection of section 5.2, 
“[M]ost people who use their boats regularly will take actions;” however, when speaking 
of people who rarely to never frequent their boat, the interviewee claimed, “Those people 
never do anything.” This concept will further be examined in the limitations section of 
this chapter. 
 Three rather surprising findings were that boat size, sentimentality, and length of 
boat ownership all resulted in nonsignificant relationships when they were correlated 
with mitigation likelihood. This is surprising because larger boats are often more 
expensive than smaller ones, and one would assume that respondents would be more 
likely to take actions to protect a greater financial liability. However, smaller boats are 
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much easier and less expensive to secure, which may negate the effects of more 
expensive boats.  
In regard to sentimentality, the lack of correlation is also unexpected, since as 
explained multiple times previously, caring about the boat should increase the likelihood 
of taking actions to protect it. The lack of correlation found in this study likely stems 
from participants overstating their level of affection for their vessels. Only 31% of the 
participants said none of their boats had sentimental value even though sentimental value 
is defined by psychologists as value “stem[ming] from an item’s intangible link to a 
cherished aspect of one’s life. Specifically, sentimental value is value derived from an 
emotionally-laden object’s associations with significant others, or special events or times 
in one’s life” (Givi and Galak, 2017, pg. 474). This definition implies a strong emotional 
connection to an object – which is concept the survey question was designed to pinpoint 
since boats are objects that can be very special to a person; however, for 69% of the 
participants to claim to have this strong emotional connection, it is unlikely that 
participants have an accurate understanding of the term and view it more as a surface 
level emotion.  
Finally, it was also surprising that length of boat ownership did not significantly 
correlate with the composite likelihood score because more experienced boaters would 
have more hurricane experience, and past experience is consistently shown to influence 
evacuation (Baker, 1991; Dow and Cuter, 2000), so it would be assumed that it would 
also influence mitigation, as well. The lack of relationship may be due to boaters’ 
additional understanding of hurricane dynamics – meaning boaters with less experience 
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still have a better understanding of atmospheric conditions than the general population, so 
they may base their decision making more on this knowledge than their past experiences.  
 Discussion of the multiple linear regression. A multiple linear regression model 
was created, with the composite likelihood score as the dependent variable and with type 
of boat owned, frequency of boat use, level of perceived procrastination, and impact of 
location, as independent variables. The R2 is relatively low but acceptable for human 
subjects’ research since it is so difficult to predict human behavior, and R2 values in this 
type of research are often below .50 (MiniTab, 2013). The R2 is also lower because only 
four independent variables were used in the regression, and each additional variable 
results in a higher R2; however, mainly, the R2 is low because none of the independent 
variables measured storm magnitude. Magnitude is the major factor in evacuation (Cutter 
et al., 2011; Sarwar et al., 2016) because it largely forms people’s perception of risk 
which drives their evacuation behavior (Sarwar et al., 2016). As evidence by the strong 
correlation between the impact of magnitude score and the composite likelihood score, 
this concept also applies to boat mitigation. People are more likely to take mitigative 
actions when they perceive a high level of risk which corresponds to larger magnitude 
storms – meaning the lack of a magnitude variable in the regression severely affects the 
efficacy of the model. When the R2 is viewed as the variance explained outside storm 
magnitude, it seems much more impressive. 
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
This study sought to examine three main questions: 1) What are the physical and 
social variables that influence the decision to take the time to secure or move a boat prior 
to hurricane landfall? 2) How does owning a boat impact a household’s decision to 
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evacuate or affect the timing of the evacuation? And 3) How well do marinas comply 
with NOAA’s hurricane preparedness guidelines throughout the year and prior to 
landfall? 
RQ 1: What are the physical and social variables that influence the decision 
to take the time to secure or move a boat prior to hurricane landfall? The first 
question can be answered simply based on the multiple linear regression. Participants had 
higher mitigation likelihood scores when they own a sailboat, use their boats more 
frequently, and plan to start taking mitigative actions farther from time of landfall. For 
physical variables, location of landfall and storm magnitude both had significant 
relationships to mitigation likelihood, with participants being more likely to mitigate for 
stronger storms. Location was interesting because it appeared that participants took 
hurricane dynamics into account when deciding on the likelihood to mitigate between the 
two locations rather than just proximity. 
RQ 2: How does owning a boat impact a household’s decision to evacuate or 
affect the timing of the evacuation? The second question is more difficult to examine 
since there is no way to compare evacuation rates between boat owners and non-boat 
owners, since everyone surveyed owned a boat. For the dataset, there was a pretty even 
split between participants who evacuated in the past and those that did not, and these 
numbers cannot be compared to other hurricane evacuation studies of the general 
population since the survey did not specify a certain storm. When looking at evacuation 
timing, a large majority of the respondents reported that taking mitigative actions would 
delay their evacuation less than six hours; however, some respondents actually think it 
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would cause over a 24-hour delay. Overall, the findings indicate that owning a boat varies 
in its effect on evacuation; however, most delays will be under 12-hours. 
RQ 3: How well do marinas comply with NOAA’s hurricane preparedness 
guidelines throughout the year and prior to landfall? The third question can be 
answered through looking at the qualitative data gleaned from the interviews. The 
marinas examined in this study both had detailed hurricane plans that the staff is 
familiarized with each year. Cooper River starts preparedness procedures 96-hours in 
advance, which gives the staff plenty of time to have the marina secured and leave well in 
advance of storm impacts. In contrast, Charleston City does not begin preparations until a 
hurricane watch has been issued – which is concerning since “[s]ome hurricane observers 
believe waiting for a watch to be posted also may be too late to adequately prepare boats 
or marina facilities” (NOAA, 2002, pg.7). Under this plan, most of the staff is able to 
leave and evacuate once a mandatory evacuation has been ordered, but an executive team 
still has to stay until the marina is completely secured.  
Overall, both marinas effectively prepare for tropical cyclone events and take 
mitigative actions throughout the year but could improve in some areas. Cooper River 
tries to keep all their patrons informed about approaching storms, but their staff should 
provide more educational materials to possibly increase the number of owners who 
evacuate their boat. Charleston City already provides these materials, and its customers 
tend to move their boats or thoroughly secure them; however, the marina and its staff 




6.3 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 This study had a variety of limitations that should be considered when viewing its 
results and merits. Probably the most important limitation is that the participants were 
surveyed at a marina and a boating community/yacht club. This means that the surveyed 
boaters were actively either working on or using their boats (Cooper River Marina) or 
they care enough about boating to live in a boating community (Belle Isle). In addition, 
none of the surveying took place in the summer, which is when less serious boaters tend 
to use their vessels. Due to these factors, none of the participants were the type of boat 
owner who owns a boat but never uses it. This is crucial to understand since, as learned in 
the interviews, some people do not frequent their boat for years at time, and these are the 
people who never do anything to mitigate damages.  
Another significant limitation is the small sample size. Sixty-four participants is 
not a large sample, and even though multiple linear regression does not require as large a 
sample size as logistic regression, the sample size was still less than what is 
recommended. Based on equation 2 (section 3.5), a linear regression with four 
independent variables, should have a sample size of 82 – meaning this study was 18 
people short of the ideal sample size for this model. The bootstrapping technique 
indicated that this may have slightly impacted the model, as the median R2 for this 
method was larger than the R2 for the whole dataset, which should be considered when 
analyzing the results of the model.  
Related to the small sample, the lack of diversity amongst the sample is 
concerning. Almost every participant was a White male, and the dataset was skewed 
towards an older, affluent population. Much of this lack of diversity can be expected as 
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owning a boat is very expensive; however, at least some racial variation would have been 
preferable, and it would have been better to have more women so that differences 
between men and women could be more effectively assessed. With the current sample, 
women are more likely than men to mitigate but only at the alpha=0.1 level. Since larger 
samples provide more power and increase the chance of finding significance, having 
more women could have resulted in a significant finding for this construct – which would 
have been very interesting since women are historically more likely to evacuate (Bateman 
and Edwards, 2002).  
 Finally, when dealing with self-reported data, response bias must be taken into 
consideration. Response bias occurs when participants “offer biased estimates of self-
assessed behavior” (Rosenman et al., 2011, pg.321). This occurs for a variety of reasons 
such as misunderstanding the question or measure; social-desirability – which is when 
participants try to make themselves sound better in their answering even though the 
survey is anonymous (Rosenman et al., 2011); and the observer-expectancy effect – 
which the American Psychological Association defines as “the effect in which the 
researcher’s belief or expectations unconsciously affects the behavior of those which are 
being observed” (qtd. in Abernethy, 2015, pg.25). Many of the problems regarding how 
participants answered certain questions likely stems from one of these types of response 
bias. For example, the problem with the sentimentality question was probably due to 
participants not understanding that the question was asking about a deep, emotional 
connection to their boat rather than it simply being important to them at a surface level. 
Another example is Question 11, which was the first question asking about mitigation 
likelihood. Fifty-three out of the 64 participants reported a 7 out of 7 for their likelihood 
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to mitigate. This was likely due to social-desirability because taking mitigative actions to 
protect an expensive piece of property is a much more socially acceptable idea than 
leaving it for the marina to deal with or insurance. While response bias is an unavoidable 
part of self-reported, human subjects research, it is still problematic and needs to be 
acknowledged.  
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH AND STUDY SIGNIFICANCE 
 Future studies should work to reduce some of the limitations present in this study 
– particularly in regard to sampling. This study was seriously limited because everyone 
surveyed took some interest in their boat since they were either actively at a marina or 
lived in a boating community with a marina and a yacht club. These people will likely 
have vastly different answers than boat owners who never frequent their boats, and this 
assertion is backed-up by the marina interviews. Future studies should also compare 
evacuation rates of boat owners to the general population; although, the lack of 
substantial time delays found in this study may indicate that there will not be a difference 
between the two groups. Last, it would be interesting to perform a similar study only 
focusing on how boat owners respond to other hazards such as winter weather in the 
northern coasts of the country.   
This study fills a gap in the hazards literature which did not address boat owners 
or marinas in a detailed manner. The conclusions of the study indicate that the same 
physical variables that influence evacuation behavior also influence mitigation actions, 
and that a variety of social variables are also related to mitigation likelihood. These 
variables are important for insurance companies to understand since they affect whether 
boat owners will be proactive in reducing damage or will leave their boats and rely on 
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insurance to mitigate their monetary loss. The study’s conclusions regarding evacuation 
timing are relevant to emergency managers because they show that boat owners will 
likely not have any substantial evacuation delays due to securing their boats in advance of 
storms. Finally, this research is very important to marina managers as they are 
responsible for protecting the boats and docks within their facilities. Ultimately, they 
need to understand that providing informational materials to their patrons is critical, as 
many less affluent boaters are unaware of where and how to evacuate their boats; the 
importance of starting preparations early since it takes a considerable amount of time to 
properly secure boats and marinas; and boaters are much less likely to take actions for 
nonmajor hurricanes – meaning there may be more potential damage to docks during 
these events, as less boats will be tied properly or evacuated.          
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
PART 1: Boating Questions 
 
1. How many years have you owned a boat? 
0-5=11     5-10=8  10-15=9  15-30=9       30+=27 
 
2. How many boats do you own? 
Mean=1.69  Median=1  n=64 
 
3. Do you have boat insurance? 
Yes=57  No=5   No Response=1 
 
4. What type of boat do you have? 
Boat 1: Sail=29  Motor=35  Other=0 
Boat 2: Sail=9  Motor=14  Other=0 
Boat 3: Sail=1  Motor=8  Other=1 – Kayak  
 
5. What is the size of your boat? 
Boat 1: < 15 feet=4  15-20=16  20-30=12  30-40=26 
40-50=5  50-75=1  75+ feet=0 
Boat 2: < 15 feet=7  15-20=5  20-30=10  30-40=0 
40-50=0  50-75=1  75+ feet=0 
Boat 3: < 15 feet=0  15-20=0  20-30= 2  30-40=2 
40-50=0  50-75=0  75+ feet=0 
 
6. Do you keep your boat in the water? 
Boat 1: Yes=43  No=21 
Boat 2: Yes=8  No=15 
Boat 3: Yes=3  No=7 
 
7. If so, how long do you keep it in the water? 
Boat 1: All the time=42  During the summer=2  On the weekends=1
 Never=19   Other=0 
Boat 2: All the time=8  During the summer=1  On the weekends=3 
 Never=11   Other=0 
Boat 3: All the time=3  During the summer=0  On the weekends=0 
 Never=7   Other=0
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8. How do you use your boat? 
Boat 1: Leisure=38  Recreational fishing=20   Racing=1
 Commercial fishing=1  Commercial tourism=0 
 Liveaboard=4 
Boat 2: Leisure=14  Recreational fishing=8  Racing:1 
Commercial fishing=0  Commercial tourism=0 
 Liveaboard=0 
Boat 3: Leisure=6  Recreational fishing=4  Racing=0 
Commercial fishing=0  Commercial tourism=0 
 Liveaboard=0 
 
9. How often do you use your boat/s? 
~ Every week=23  A couple times a month=21  ~ Once a month=11 
Every few months=6  A couple times per year=3 
 
10. Does your boat have sentimental value? 
Boat 1: Yes=40  No=24 
Boat 2: Yes=11  No=10 
Boat 3: Yes=5  No=5 
 
11. How likely are you to take actions to reduce or minimize boat damage before 
a hurricane?  
7-Point Scale: 
1=Not Likely at All 
7=Very Likely 
Mean=6.66  Median=7  n=64 
 
12. How likely is the cone of uncertainty to affect this decision? 
7-Point Scale: 
1=Not Likely at All 
7=Very Likely 
Mean=5.08  Median=6  n=64 
 
13. How many hours before landfall do you think you would begin to take these 
actions?  
+72 hours=24  48-72=19  36-48=13  24-36=4  
< 24 hours=4 
 
14. What actions would you take? 
Move the boat to a hurricane hole:  
Yes=26  No=38 
Evacuating the boat on a trailer: 
Yes=27  No=37 
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Securing the boat in its wet slip w/ ropes: 
Yes=32  No=32 
Securing the boat in its rack w/ ropes: 
Yes=9   No=55 
Took down the sail: 
Yes=26  No=38 
Other: 
Take off canvas, covers, loose objects, etc. 
Double lines and fenders 
Hauled out 
 
15. If you plan to evacuate your boat, where would you move it? 




16. Will you prepare your boat before or after securing your home? 
Before=39  After=16  Not Applicable=9 
 
17. If you planned to evacuate from the storm, how many hours do you think 
securing your boat would delay your evacuation? 
0=15  0-3=13  3-6=10  6-12=13  20-24=4    24+=2 
Wouldn’t evacuate=4 
Vacationing (will leave the area but didn’t “evacuate”)=3 
 
18. If your household planned to evacuate from the storm, would securing your 
boat delay their evacuation as well? 
Yes=32  No=26      Wouldn’t evacuate=2 
Vacationing (will leave the area but didn’t “evacuate”)=4 
PART II: Hypothetical Hurricane Scenarios 
Please answer the following questions based on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale: 
Tropical storm: 34-64 knots         
Cat 1: 65-83 knots 
Cat 2: 84-95 knots                         
Cat 3: 96-113 knots    
Cat4: 114-134 knots                       
Cat 5: ≥ 135 knots 
 
Hypothetical Scenario I: Tropical system making landfall below Charleston within 
72 hours. 
How likely are you to take actions to reduce or minimize boat damage based on the 




1=Not Likely at All 
7=Very Likely 
19. <Cat 1 (tropical storm) 
Mean=3.33  Median=2  n=64 
 
20. Cat 1 
Mean=4.78  Median=5  n=64 
 
21. Cat 2 
Mean=5.91  Median=7  n=64 
 
22. Cat 3 
Mean=6.75  Median=7  n=64 
 
23. Cat 4 
Mean=6.80  Median=7  n=64 
 
24. Cat 5 
Mean=6.83  Median=7  n=64 
 
Hypothetical Scenario II: Tropical system making landfall near Myrtle Beach 
within 72 hours. 
How likely are you to take actions to reduce or minimize boat damage based on the 
following wind-scale categories? 
 
7-Point Scale: 
1=Not Likely at All 
7=Very Likely 
25. <Cat 1 (tropical storm) 
Mean=2.67  Median=1  n=64 
 
26. Cat 1 
Mean=3.70  Median=4  n=64 
 
27. Cat 2 
Mean=4.84  Median=5  n=64 
 
28. Cat 3 
Mean=5.81  Median=7  n=64 
 
29. Cat 4 
Mean=6.58  Median=7  n=64 
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30. Cat 5 
Mean=6.70  Median=7  n=64 
 
PART III: Past Behavior 
 
31. Has your boat ever been through a tropical system? 
 (If you answer no, skip to question 38.) 
Yes=58  No=6  Don’t Know=0 
 
32. How strong was that storm (Based on the Saffir-Simpson Scale)? 
< 1=3  1=17  2=25  3=5  4=4  5=4 
 
33. Did you take any actions to protect your boat?  
(If you answer no, skip to question 38.) 
Yes=55  No=3  Don’t Know=0 
 
34. If so, what actions did you take? 
Move the boat to a hurricane hole:  
Yes=16  No=39 
Evacuating the boat on a trailer: 
Yes=19  No=36 
Securing the boat in its wet slip w/ ropes: 
Yes=28  No=27 
Securing the boat in its rack w/ ropes: 
Yes=7   No=48 
Took down the sail: 
Yes=24  No=31 
Other:  
Take off canvas, covers, loose objects, etc. 
Double lines and fenders 
Hauled out 
 
35. How many hours before landfall did you begin these actions? 
+72 hours=19  48-72=13  36-48=11  24-36=7  
< 24 hours=5 
 
36. How many hours did it take to secure the boat? 
1-2 hours=16  2-5=18  5-7=12  7-10=6  10-15=2  
15-20=1  20+ hours=0 
 
37. Did you prepare your boat before or after preparing your home? 




38. Did you evacuate from the hurricane? 
Yes=25  No=32  Vacationing (left the area but didn’t “evacuate”)=4 
 
39. Did the rest of your household evacuate? 
Yes=29  No=28  Vacationing (left the area but didn’t “evacuate”)=4 
 
40. If so, do you feel you had enough time to prepare your home prior to 
evacuating? 
Yes=30  No=3  Not Applicable=29 
 
41. If you took actions to secure your boat, do you feel that securing your boat 
influenced the amount of time you had to prepare your house?  
(If you did not take actions, skip this question.) 
7-Point Scale: 
1=Not Likely at All 
7=Very Likely 
Mean=2.73  Median=3  n=64 
 
PART IV: Demographic Questions 
 
42. What is your age? 
Mean=55  Median=58  n=64 
 
43. How many minors (< 18) live in your household? 
Mean=0.49  Median=0  n=64 
 
44. Which of the following best describes your annual household income? 
< $20,000=3   $20,000-$40,000=6  $40,000-$60,000=7  
$60,000-$80,000=8  $80,000-$100,000=5  $100,000-$150,000=9 
$150,000-$200,000=12 $200,000+=10 
 
45. What is your gender? 
Male=54  Female=10  Other=0 
 
46. What do you consider your racial background?     
White =63  Hispanic or Latino=1  Black or African American=0 
Native American=0  Asian/Pacific Islander=0 
 
47. Is there anything else you would like me to know about your experiences as a 
boat owner during tropical cyclone events? 
Every storm is different 
Preparation depends a lot on forecast – which direction 
Prepare/move boat early to avoid danger
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APPENDIX B: OUTLINE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Does the marina have a formal marina hurricane preparedness plan? 
a. What procedures are included in this plan?  
2. How long before predicted hurricane impacts does the marina start taking actions 
to secure the marina? 
3.  Does the marina require wet slip evacuations in the rental contracts? 
4. Does the marina ever have hurricane drills to test the preparedness plan and to 
increase the crews’ familiarity with the procedures? 
5. Does the marina offer any educational programs for boat owners such as 
anchoring clinics or tours to the local hurricane holes? 
6. How long before predicted hurricane impacts is the crew allowed to leave the 
marina to prepare their households and evacuate if needed? 
a. Is there a schedule for crew members to take turns leaving to secure their 
homes before returning to continue the preparations? 
7. Does the marina survey boat owners using a “Boat Owner’s Hurricane Readiness 
Questionnaire” throughout the year to find out the owners’ plans and preparations 
for their boats given a hurricane – including absentee owner provisions, license to 
move, etc.?
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APPENDIX C: CHARLESTON CITY MARINA HURRICANE PLAN 
Source: Charleston City Interviewee 
Hurricane Tasks & Operational Guidelines 
SAFETY FIRST 
Hurricane Watch Tasks 
• Keep the customer informed of Hurricane Plan/Schedule 
a. Send out impending weather email to prepare vessels 
b. Send TCBY Hurricane Haul/Help email 
c. Send notice of closing hours and the date/time of utilities shut down 
i. Post signs in office, restrooms, laundry, gates, and sign on van 
• Stop taking transient reservations (decide on date and relay to staff) 
• If evacuation is announced or flooding expected, stop running van downtown and 
post a sign at van stop 
• Pull most trash bins off mega dock, place at containers and tie down 
• Email slip holders (have City Boatyard’s Mobile Service Contact available) 
including monthlies and nightly vessels 
• Fuel all vehicles and equipment to include work truck, TCM van, fire cart equip, 
jerry jugs for generators,  
• Fender work float on back side of K-dock 
• Have Safety-Kleen empty oil totes in Enviro Trailer 
• Round up push carts at head of dock and secure
• Secure Cleats to the jet dock and be sure the gas tank is full 
• Relocate large vessels from outside wall and Z-dock 
• Tie lines from backside of WW-dock to wall 
• Pull flags down from Dock Office 
• Contact larger vessels’ owners/captains and check their plans 
• Store signs 
• Take down Happy Hour tent top and store in 3 Lockwood 
Hurricane Warning Tasks 
• Print contact list for annual, monthly and nightly tenants to include phone 
numbers. 
• Print employee hurricane sheets and make sure up to date 
• Move benches into dock office 
• Drop web cam down to lowest height and pin in place 
• Strap dock carts together at the head of the CW 
• Bring all major files to main office 
• Take company vehicles to Beach Co parking garage 
• Place computers on floor in main office 
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• Pull P/O boats (all but the Alcoa) and take to TCBY 
• Pull the MegaPower trailers to the parking lot 
• Take golf carts to Beach Co parking garage or if time does not allow tie up 
together on the gas dock 
• Pull remaining trash bins from mega dock and place in the parking lot 
• Tie down P/O hoses (coil and tie to cleats) 
• Take van to Mary Street parking garage 
• Tie off dumpsters 
• Forward dock office phones to the van cell phone 
• Take electronics from the Dock Office to the TCM Conf Room 
• Shut power and water off to the docks 
• Remove inventory from transient shed. (Don’t stack it will float and topple over) 
• Raise boxes in package shed off the floor, call people to pick them up 
• Remove t-shirts, baskets, and anything low enough for the water to reach, 
depending on forecasted storm surge/tide 
• Call arrivals through period the marina is closed and update them on marina’s 
plans and ask about  their plans to still come in 
• Take down Happy Hour tent 
• Use Sand bags as chocks for trailers 
• Close diesel line valves at top of dock, CW gangway and old gas dock area 
• Hit one of the estops and turn TMS machine off 
Diesel Dispenser/Tank Prep 
• Top off tanks 
• Coil and tie down fuel hoses on the MD to MD cleats 
• Turn fuel valves in the main diesel line to the off position at the transition/filter 
sump and the CW gate 
• Zip tie fuel tank caps closed 
• Turn off power to tank pumps/dispensers (most likely we will shut down all 
power to the docks) 
• Manual pump is located in 3 Lockwood  
Marine Fuels: 
• Fill up TCM vessels, generators and fuel containers before shutting down fuel/gas 
• Top off both gas and diesel UST 
• Shut Gas and Diesel Ball Valves 
• Shut power off to fuel system (E-STOP) 
• Zip tie UST fuel fill cap shut 
Sea Store:  
• Try and keep pumps running as long as it is safe to do so 
• Try and coordinate traffic when possible and inform of product outage  
• Keep staff informed on hours of operation/closing 
• Top off fuel tanks (place Cel on alert for short truck if needed – 2800 or 4500 
gallon truck) 
• Zip tie nozzles to dispensers and wrap with caution tape 
• Tie down trash cans or place in the store 
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• Turn off canopy and store lights 
• Sand bag doors 
• Be sure to have extra cash on hand to operate the store should the credit card 
machines go down 
• Move any low electronics to the TCM Conf Room 
• Have a contact with an organization to remove water from fuel tanks if needed 
• Trip breakers off for nonessential equipment to include: 
o Dispensers, coffee burners/maker, sales counter, in-store lighting, canopy 
lights, veeder root, pricing sign 
Parking:  
• Keep Staff informed of hours of operation/closing 
• Relocate computer, battery backups, power strips, and any other electrical 
equipment that can be removed to TCM conf room 
• Pull parking gate arms  as needed and place storage unit 
Office: 
• Inform staff of hours of operation/closing 
• Relocate any computers near windows to the Conf Room 
• Contact Beach IT and plan to shut power to the servers off and unplug from wall 
jacks if needed 
• Unplug any equipment not needed (Ex. Copier/Printer/Fax 
• Turn off HVAC unit breakers 
Post Hurricane City Marina Docks 
• Conduct a dockwalk when safe to do so in order to assess damage. 
• Create a triage list 
• Notify customers of the status of the marina and power/utilities 
• Inform staff of modified or regular business hours of operation. 
• Place insurance agent on notice of potential damage 
• Notify advertisers of our status (Ex. Open/Under Repairs/Closed/Etc) 
o Advertisers to include: Waterway Guide, Salty Southeast Cruisers Net, 
Marinas.com, MarinaLife, NMMA contact, DockWa 
Post Hurricane Marine Fuels 
• Conduct a dockwalk when safe to do so in order to assess damage. 
• Create a triage list 
• Inform staff of modified or regular business hours of operation. 
• Check electrical equipment before power equipment back up.  
• Place insurance agent on notice of potential damage 
Post Hurricane Sea Store 
• Check electrical equipment before turning equipment breakers back on 
• Create a triage list 
• Check food items for inventory loss and record 
• Report inventory loss to insurance agent 
• Clean/Pump out dispenser sumps 
• Blow off concrete area under the canopy and clean up bottles/trash 
• Check the gas tanks for gas with water paste 
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• Inform staff of modified or regular business hours of operation. 
• Place insurance agent on notice of potential damage 
Post Hurricane Parking 
• Open up all fixed parking equipment and let dry out 
• Check equipment before powering up the booth 
• Bring all equipment back to the booth from the main office and run equipment 
when known to be safe to do so 
• Install gate arms 
• Inform staff of modified or regular business hours of operation.  
• Place insurance agent on notice of potential damage 
 
Post Hurricane Office 
• Check electrical equipment and plug back in as appropriate 
• If power is out wait until it is restored and turn HVAC breakers on 
• Inform staff of modified or regular business hours of operation. 
• Place insurance agent on notice of potential damage 
Post Hurricane Diesel Dispenser/Diesel/Gas Tank Prep 
• Be aware of any downed power lines that could be energized  
• Visually check all equipment before trying to restore power to the system 
• Check the wiring and junction boxes along with the rectifier for impressed current 
cathodic protection systems before restoring power 
• Be alert to indications of electrical shorts or failed wiring as you attempt to restart 
the system 
• Check for water in the fuel/gas using a measuring stick and water paste before 
dispensing any fuel 
• Conduct frequent checks of sumps, dispensers, pans, and measure for water in the 
tank several times during the first couple of days after resuming operations. 
Check for water after each delivery 
• Be alert for unusual operating conditions such as slow dispensing of fuel, frequent 
alarms, customer complaints or equipment shut downs. Extra filters are in 3 
Lockwood if needed 
